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THE
MINISTER JĀBĀLI
IN
VĀLMĪKI'S RĀMĀYAṆA

—*The Portrait of one of the Indian Materialists*—

WALTER RUBEN

R. 1

One of the most famous materialists of ancient India is Jābāli[1], the minister of king Daśaratha of Ayodhyā in the epic *Rāmāyaṇa,* in which he appears only once with his materialistic argumentation. To do justice to this, it is necessary to examine it in the greater context of an artistically built-up plot of the epic.

Vālmīki devotes the whole of the second book of his epic to the tragedy of the old king Daśaratha, which stretches over a few days leading to his death. The old man gets involved in a conflict of two duties, of which one is of a political nature and the other develops out of his family life in the form of a court-intrigue.[2] He is unable to solve the conflict and feels guilty because of it, for which atone he must.

Politically, it is a question of his retirement on account of his old age. He himself suggests an assembly of the people for electing Rāma, his first-born, the noble hero, as his successor. The people consent to it enthusiastically and the old king fixes the next day as the day of coronation.

Immediately afterwards, however, his youngest and the then most favourite wife Kaikeyī induces him to banish Rāma and coronate her own son Bharata. As a result of this intrigue in the lady-chamber, the grey-haired one, though much to his agony, forsakes the path of democracy, still remembered since the days of primitive communities, viz. the public election of the new king, and thereby paves the way for despotism by banishing Rāma without asking for the opinion of the people this time.

The poet vividly depicts the pricks of conscience of the lamenting grey-haired king for his slavish submission to the young wife. These were the last centuries before our era, when in the Ganges valley there still lingered the tribes, (the gentile order of which, of course, had already disintegrated), side by side with the states of slave-maintaining depotism, which were obviously the immediate successors of

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1. Jābāli is mentioned e.g. by H. v. Glasenapp, *Die Philosophie der Inder*, Stuttgart, 1949, p. 128 ; by L. Silburn in L. Renou & J. Filliozat, *L'Inde Classique*, ii., Paris 1953, Sec. 1499 ; by W. Ruben, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie,* Berlin 1954, pp. 150 f.
2. About this in further details, see W. Ruben, *Vier Liebestragoedien des Rāmāyaṇa*, ZDMG, Vol. 100 (1950), p. 287 ff.

the old tribal democracies.[3] Thus he makes the king a despot, though very reluctantly. All these were inherent in the tradition of the sagas, which must have preceded[4] the composition of the epic. Rāma had to be banished that he might play the mythological role of destructor of Rāvaṇa, the abductor of Rāma's wife Sītā. This banishment had thus to be thoroughly established. Politically it was unjustified, for Rāma was the legitimate and moreover the most desired heir to the throne whom the people rightly idolised and chose and this in accordance with the justified proposal of the old king and father. Under these catastrophic circumstances, the despotic overthrow of the resolution of the popular assembly needed a convincing ground which Vālmīki found in the bed-chamber intrigue of the young wife. Kaikeyī does not bother about the decision of the people, but takes interest only in her own son. The king is under her grip. He is infatuated with her. But this is not enough for the poet. He must protect the old king, the father of his ideal hero Rāma, from all unfavourable impressions. Therefore, he takes recourse to fatalism, the weapon of the weaklings, the paralysing sickness of the ancient religions[5] of India. He narrates how once the young Daśaratha while hunting in a forest, thought to have heard an elephant, shot an arrow, which, however, hit a youth. As a result of this, he was cursed by the father of the boy that he would likewise suffer for his son and succumb[6] to it. The passion for hunting drags Daśaratha towards this curse, which the poet invents as being indispensable for the justification of the passionate love of the grey-haired Daśaratha.

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[3] In a particular sense Vālmīki's stand corresponds to that of the Buddha, who came from the Śākya tribe and sympathised with the Vṛji tribe (*Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, ed. E. Waldschmidt, ii, Berlin 1951, p. 106 ff).

[4] Compare W. Ruben, *Ueber die ethische Idealgestalt des Rama*, *Studia Indologica* (Festschrift Kirfel), Bonn 1955, p. 277ff, specially p. 279f on the vestige of the old sagas of the Īkṣvākus.

[5] About fatalism see under note 24. cf. Gāndhārī's curse to Kṛṣṇa (W. Ruben, *Kṛṣṇa*, Istanbul 1943, p. 232 f) and also Durvāsā's curse to Śakuntalā etc.

[6] *Rāmāyaṇa* A ii. 70.53 f, B ii. 66.54f, C ii. 64. 53f. (About the north-western version referred to here as A, the north-eastern version referred to here as B and the southern version referred to here as C, cf. W. Ruben, *Studien zur Textgeschichte des Rāmāyaṇa*, Stuttgart 1936). In *Jātaka* No. 540 is mentioned the king of Benares who has killed the young one Sāma of the ascetics, whose parents do not curse out of a Buddhistic tendency.

The curse,—the fate,—operates in a complicated manner. Once Kaikeyī accompanied the king to a battle, nursed his wounds and earned of him two boons of her own choice. This was customary, but dangerous nonetheless. Because the king was bound to do anything anytime of which he had then no notion whatsoever. Many years later, the queen now demands Rāma's banishment and Bharata's coronation. Daśaratha has to abide by his word, but at the same time has to abide by his word[7] to the people. Thereby he comes to a tragic conflict. He has to abide by two contradictory promises and thus turns out a despot, who, because of his unworthy amorousness, disowns the will of the people and all political judgments.

To find out a possible excuse for the king, the poet makes him swear to Kaikeyī even before she opens her heart to him, that he must now fulfil[8] his once-given word. The king swears, but collapses later on in such a manner that he is not able to impart his new decision to Rāma. That is why Kaikeyī herself is made to converse decisively with Rāma, so much so, that Rāma swears before her that he would do anything his father orders ; he would even drink poison or throw himself into the ocean that he might abide by[9] his word.

She on her part tells him of the new decision of the father only after she reminds him once again that the condition is that he should keep[10] the word of his father. After this, Rāma has no alternative but to prepare himself immediately and unconditionally for his banishment. He is indeed as indecisive in his idealism as his father, that he promises something before knowing what Kaikeyī would demand of him. However, in such indecision the ancient Indian idealists in fact sees the Heroic : whoever gives such a promise is indeed so noble that he should be credited with the fulfilment of any promise whatsoever. And it is but understandable. When the moral teachings in ancient Indian despotism lays the greatest stress upon the keeping of the given promise, how often could a despot dare break his word !

On the other hand, Lakṣmaṇa takes his father into task for being lustful, hen-pecked, childish, even crazy. Who would obey such a king, though father,[11] who understood even an iota of politics[12] (lit. who remembers the code of conduct of the earlier kings), or knew of the rights and privileges of kings[13] ? Rāma has to assert himself before any one comes to know the new decision of the king. He, Lakṣmaṇa, would help him if necessary in depopulating the whole of Ayodhyā with his arrows by killing[14] all those who sided with Bharata.

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[7] Cf. A. p. 292 and the passage cited above in C 12.67.

[8] A ii.13.25 cd f ; B 9.19 ; C 11.22.

[9] A ii.19.31 cd f, 32. cd f ; B 15. 26 cd f, 28 cd f ; C 18.29,30.

[10] A ii.19.36 cd f ; B 15. 34 cd f ; C 18.34.

The grey-haired queen Kauśalyā, Rāma's noble and pious mother, decided in favour of this violent decision of Lakṣmaṇa.[15] She demands further of Rāma the obedience of a son and threatens him that in case he goes to the jungle in banishment she would fast[16] to death

Rāma, however, insists that the word of his father should be kept[17] and absolves Kaikeyī as being but a tool of destiny.[18] Who, after all, is able to fight[19] destiny ? But Lakṣmaṇa retorts that only the weakling bows before destiny, not the strong ; he strongly asserts his manliness against destiny, and now the world would see how manliness could fight against destiny, provided Rāma took a firm stand[20].

Against this anti-fatalism Rāma has nothing new in reply.[21]

The poet has no other alternative but to place in contrast to the idealist Rāma an opponent in the form of his faithful brother inside Rāma's own family, who would later share with him all the hardships of banishment,—a professed anti-fatalist, a representative of the real politics, who would forcibly establish the rightful policy (as he himself represents it). Lakṣmaṇa thereby serves the poet as a foil to Rāma, the embodiment of idealism, which represents "Truth" as contrasted with "Force", a pair of strange bed-fellows for us ; this trend may be traced from the Upaniṣads down to Rabindranath Tagore and Gandhi without break[22], and it plays a great role in the second book of the *Rāmāyaṇa,* which we shall gradually unfold.

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[11] Only in C ii.21.12 is Lakṣmaṇa ready even to kill the father : cf. Ajātaśatru of Magadha who killed his father Bimbisāra and was consoled by philosophers such as Ajita etc. (*Digha-nikāya ii*).

[12] C ii. 21.7 ; *rājavṛtta* (cf Tilaka).

[13] A ii. 21.7 ; B 18.9.

[14] A ii. 21. 3-11 ; B 18. 3-5, 8-13 ; C 21.1-11.

[15] A ii. 21.22 ab ; B 18.24 ab ; C 21.24 cd.

[16] A ib. 27cd f ; B 29 cd f ; C 27 : *prāya* ; cf. W. Ruben, *Der Sinn des Dramas*, "Das Siegel und Rākṣasa", Berlin 1956, 127 Note 8.

[17] B ib. 19.6 ; C 22.9 (is absent in A).

[18] A ii. 22.11 f ; B 19.16 f ; C 22.16 f.

[19] A ib. 16 ; B 18 ; C 21.

[20] A ii. 23.19 cd-22 ; B 20.19 cd-22 ; C 23.16-19 ab, with palpable variations.

[21] A ii. 23.47 ; B 20.47, which is very similar to C 23.41. Rāma's answer is more detailed in A ii. 24ff ; B 21ff, to which C does not at all refer.

Later, Lakṣmaṇa appears once again[23] in the epic almost as a "materialist" and here he represents an anti-fatalism which had been well-known since the Polity of Kauṭalya : only a weakling finds excuse for his faults in fatalism[24] ! But Vālmīki, the author of the epic, is himself a fatalist and as such definitely depicts the life of Rāma as one involved in cosmic fate, as if Rāma being prudent was submitting himself to the inevitability of sorrows.

As against his slavish silence, Lakṣmaṇa appears in the active role. This contrast between quietitude and activity, as is well-known, was the fundamental issue for the ancient Indian moral philosophers[25].

But Lakṣmaṇa's furious outburst of anti-idealism is not expressedly rejected by the poet. Rather, Kauśalyā, the noble queen, takes sides with Lakṣmaṇa, although she does not express any explicit approval of his argumentation in favour of force.

The people of the city see Rāma going to the palace. They receive the decision of the despot without the least demand of being heard ; they press only that they would follow Rāma with their women and children to the jungle[26] ; Kaikeyī might then rule over the depopulated city, and the city might turn into a jungle[27].

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22. cf. W. Ruben, *Ueber den Materialisten Sandip in Tagores 'Das Heim und die Welt'* in Festschrift Erkes, Leipzig 1956.
23. cf. W. Ruben, see Note 1 above, p. 151.
24. *ib.*, p. 148 ; W. Ruben (See Note 16) 75.
25. Ruben (See Note 1) 157. Note 10.
26. A ii. 36.19 ; B 33.19 ; C 33.16.
27. A *ib.* 23-24 ab ; B 23-24 ab ; C 21 cd-22.

This is a threat of a *secessio plebis* in ancient India. One might observe that the ancient kingdom of Ayodhyā, as found in the archaic portrayal of the epic poets, was not yet far from the conditions of the primitive community. And the migrations of the tribal communities were usual even in later stages, as evinced by the Santals and petty Vedic chiefs during the age of the Brāhmaṇas[28].

However, because of an artful device of Rāma, there was no such insurrection of the people against the old king Daśaratha. The citizens simply accompanied the departing Rāma[29] for the first day, and stayed with him overnight on the open bank of the river Tamasā. But early next morning, Rāma travelled further with Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa and crossed the Tamasā. The citizens woke up and saw the track of the chariot, thought that Rāma should have returned to the city and themselves turned back[30].

Daśaratha meanwhile had died in his palace, repentant over this injustice perpetrated upon Rāma. Bharata refused to be crowned against the will of his own mother Kaikeyī, denying her outright. He set out decidedly with his army to induce Rāma to return home. In course of time, he camped his army and went with his brother Śatrughna, the charioteer Sumantra and the ministers[31] to Rāma's cottage in the jungle. He informed Rāma of the father's death and persuaded him to perform with all parapharnelia the funeral rites of Daśaratha. The Brahmin Vaśiṣṭha brought together the widows of Daśaratha and, amidst the great assembly, Bharata offered the throne to Rāma. His arguments were as follows : Kaikeyī has sinned[32] ; Daśaratha has acted wrongly[33] due to his dotage ; you must protect us as our ruler[34] ; I am much too young and as such am not at all worthy to be king[35] ; the priests should crown you here and now[36] ; to rule is the first duty of the Kṣatriya[37].

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[28] W. Ruben, *Ueber die Santal*, in, *Ueber die Literatur der vorarischen Staemme Indiens*, Berlin 1952, p. 61. Ueber Koenig Śaryāta in Ruben, *Beginn der Philosophie in Indien*, Berlin 1955, 37ff ; *ib.* 237 on Yájñavalkya & 320 on Ajātaśatru.

[29] A ii. 43.34 cd, 35-36 ab ; B 39.33 ab, 33 cd in place of 34 ; C 40.27 ab, 27 cd.

[30] A ii. 48.31 ; B 44.30 ; in C 47.1-19 this error is not found, but is found in the Indonesian version (Stutterheim, see under Note 89, p. 40).

[31] A ii. 113.1-6 ; B 108.1-6 ; Similar to C 99.1-8. Similarly the king Duṣyanta dismisses his retinue before he enters the hermitage of Kaṇva in Kālidāsa's *Śakuntalā*.

[32] A ii. 118.2 ; B 113.2 ; C 106.8.

[33] *Ib.* A 6f ; B 6f ; C 12f.

[34] *Ib.* A 11 f ; B 11 f ; C 17 f.

Rāma, however, insisted that he would make good his father's word[38] as a faithful son. He admonished Bharata to remain a good son and thus absolve his father of his debt[39]. Because such a son (*pu-tra*) rescues (*trai*) the father from the hell named *pum*[40], as Gayā has prescribed in his Ancestral Rites.[41]. He should also protect his mother.

Ancestral sacrifices are being performed even today preferably at Gayā and in a Purāṇic legend about Gayā is said that the ancestors cherish a desire that their son makes pilgrimage to Gayā to save his ancestors from the hell[42]. During this ancestral sacrifice, the Brāhmaṇas of the place are to be invited to a feast.[43]

At this juncture, the minister Jābāli takes up the cue, as Bharata stands by sighing and silent. Jābāli is here depicted conspicuously as the most respectable Brahmin.[44] In the Bengali version he is called here "the knower of moral", and both the north-Indian versions read that his (materialistic) speech is "moral" (as contrasted with "amoral" in the south-Indian manuscripts). Many an Indian Brahmin, at least those who copied these north-Indian manuscripts of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, have thus not read any moral offence in the materialism of Jābāli. Govindarāja, a south-Indian commentator, has restricted the meaning of the word "amoral" to mean "without Vedic moral" which is right in a broad sense, inasmuch as Jābāli and other ancient Indian materialists were without any religious moral but not without those specially practical morals, thought, preached and practised.

Unfortunately, the first words of Jābāli are vague and obscure :

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[35] *Ib.* A 15 ; B 15 ; C 23.

[36] *Ib.* A 18 ; B 18 ; C 26.

[37] *Ib.* A 23 ; B 23 ; C 19.

[38] A ii. 120.8 ; B 115.8 ; C 107.8.

[39] *Ib.* A 10 ; B 10 ; C 10.

[40] *Ib.* A 12 ; B 12 ; C 12.

[41] *Ib.* A 11 ; B 11 ; C 11.

[42] See P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra* iv. p. 605 (Poona 1953).

[43] *Ib.* p. 655 ; On the Gayaval, the Brahmins of Gayā, see *Ib.* p. 644.

[44] A ii, 121.1 ; B 116.2 ; C 108.1. Govindarāja explains : Herewith is explained that for him materialism is not a thing of the heart.

"Well, Rāma, (but)[45] you should not act aimlessly like a layman. You are indeed wise *par excellence* and yet in a fix"[46]—i.e. to be obedient to the father is by itself praiseworthy for the masses, but in your case it is politically wrong !

After this Jābāli stresses, as the first point, upon the problem of the obedience of a son to the dead father and how openly the "highly intelligent" Rāma should see this in his indecision. Had Rāma answered that the faithful son was to save the father from the hell, the materialist would ask : What signifies the relationship of the one with the other ? What could one further through another ? A being is born alone and alone it dies. Whoever hangs on a being, whom one calls one's father or mother ? He who hangs on them is as one without sense, because there are no such relations. As a wanderer spends just a night in a village that he leaves behind on the morrow and departs, so are father, mother, home and hearth but a passing abode upon which none who is wise hangs[47].

To us this appears pitiless. But any ascetic of any Indian creed must have approved of this. Did not the Buddha leave aside his parents, his wife and child and retreat into a wandering life ? According to the theory of transmigration of souls, every soul experiences since the beginningless past its self-inflicted fate through ever renewed rebirths and the reward and punishment for its own activities. The souls, ever lonely and wandering, meet together incidentally and for a short while in a family, or perhaps according to their fate, because it is the fate of the son whom he meets as father and it is the fate of the father that determines the nature of the son. In general, however, there does not exist any bond between two souls in the course of their wanderings, excepting that the members of a pair of brothers or of a husband and wife choose each other through many a rebirth to be bound to each other and destined for each other. This has been time and again emphasised.[48] Thus we find the doctrine of rebirth going against the religious teaching that a son could deliver the father of the hell. The magical conception, which considers the reward and the punishment as coming not out of the migration of souls but merely due to heaven and hell, originates presumably from a totally different stratum of the old Vedic religious thought.

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45. "but" is here an emendation.
46. A ii. 121.2 ; B 116.3 ; C 108.2. A corresponds to C ; B : 'the viewpoint of the poor is at fault' (that Rāma or any son of the father should hold to the truth is perhaps meant here). In B follow then the verses 116.4-11 as interpolation.
47. *Ib.* A 3-6 ; B 12-15 ; C 3-6.
48. Cf. the Caṇḍāla brothers in *Jātāka* 498.

The materialist, thus, does not declaim here any particularly materialistic moral. He speaks from the standpoint of the eternal isolation of all souls generally prevalent in ancient India. Thus, in the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (iii. 1)[49], Pratardana, an idealist proclaims that even patricide and matricide are not sins for the mystic. Again, Ajita Keśakambala, a materialist of the time of the Buddha[50] consoles the parricide and despot Ajātaśatru of Magadha with a similar argument without any scruple. Thus the bond of piety of the primitive community was torn asunder once for all by the despotism of the ruling class. To this extent one can connect the materialist Jābāli with the materialist Ajita in the context of the tradition of the old Indian despotism. But Vālmīki in these opening sentences of Jābāli suggests nothing specially objectionable (at least according to the religious concepts of the day) or materialistic. On the contrary, in accordance with his conception of Rāma as an ideal of piety the author of the epic notes his dissent to the standpoint of the minister.

Jābāli continues : You should not give up your paternal kingdom and walk on the thorny paths of the jungle. Allow yourself to be coronated in the prosperous city of Ayodhyā, for she waits for you like a faithful bride.[51] Enjoying kingly pleasures pass your time in Ayodhyā like Indra in heaven.[52]

In the southern version, Jābāli speaks here of the "paternal kingdom", though he previously describes the relation of a son to father as of no consequence. He takes here the customary position—'idealistic', according to the commentary of Tilaka. In order to do away with this contradiction, both the northern versions have altered the text a bit here[53] without changing the basic thought of this section.

You are the rightful king. In mythology and theology, that means the groom of your faithful city that waits as a languishing bride for her departed groom. In these words, Jābāli is right, because the people of Ayodhyā desire through their actions to have Rāma back as the king. There is here no reference to the materialism which is so peculiar of him.

Jābāli next comes back to his first argument[54] : Daśaratha is nobody for

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49. Cf. Ruben (Note 28, 1955) 321.
50. Ruben (Note 1) 105.
51. Cf. *Ekaveṇī* in *Meghadūta* 89.
52. A ii. 121.7-9 ; B 116.16-18 ; C 101.7-9.
53. B 19 : 'You dare not discard the dirtless and smooth way' ; A 7 : 'You dare not give up the people aimlessly',
54. Tilaka : He bases it on the teaching of the *kṣaṇabhaṅga*. (Is it the Buddhist teaching of momentariness ?).

you and you are nobody for him. The king is a different person and so are you, and, therefore, do as I say : The father is no more an agent for your being than the seed. When the seed (of the father) and the blood (of the mother)[55] are mingled inside the fecund mother, a man[56] is born in this world.

This idea of the union of sperm and blood leading to conception is common to India.[57] One wishing to read materialism in these words of Jābāli would possibly refer to the fact that he does not mention the eternal soul in referring to the birth,—the soul which, at the moment of conception, unites itself with the sperm and blood, i.e. with the material body.[58] Thus Vālmīki does not allow him to emphasise materialism in particular here. On the other hand, he allows him to speak on the lines of the customary science and medicine, which merely mention such things as blood and sperm that one can see, and not of such super-sensuous factors as the soul of the idealists.

The king is gone there where he had to. That is the way of all beings. Your suffering[59] is of no avail.[60]

Thereby Jābāli naturally means that Rāma need not lament over his father, need no more abide by the words of the dead and not perform any funeral rite for him (on which he dilates later on).

I deplore only those who run after ideals and morals,[61] because they preach nothing but sorrow on this side and find the end[62] in death.

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[55] B 20 adds further "wind" ; this verse on medical view is absent in A.

[56] A ii. 121.10 ; B 116.19-20 ; C 108.10-11.

[57] Cf. L. Hilgenberg and W. Kirfel, *Vāgbhaṭa's Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya saṃhitā*, Leiden 1941, p. 162. W. Kirfel, *Ein medizinisches Kapitel des Garuḍapurāṇas, Asiatica* (Festschrift Fr. Weller), Leipzig 1954, p. 333 ff.

[58] Cf. *Caraka-saṃhitā* iv (Śarīrasthāna), 1.

[59] A : *anutapyase* ; B & C : *vihanyase* ; Govindarāja : *pīḍyase*. Tilaka : 'You will be deprived of this goal, namely kingship.

[60] A ii. 121.11 ; B 116.21 ; C 108.12.

[61] B : *arthadharmavidaḥ* ; C : *arthadharmaparāḥ* ; Govindarāja : Giving up lust and always striving after ideals and morals. (Cf. the *trivarga* : *kāma, artha, dharma*). Tilaka differently : After reaching the goal to give it up and see morals. Satya : To strive after morals by means of abstinence (*arthena*, i.e. *nivṛtya*). A : Whoever confides in those who run after the other world ?

[62] A ii. 121.12 ; B 116.22 ; C 108.13.

Here at last is the materialism unequivocal. After the death nothing remains. There is no reward for the moral and justified action, which might be a provision for the other world. Moreover, with this anti-religious materialism is related the Epicurean stand of *Carpe diem* : it does not pay to waste one's energy upon earthly heroic deeds, the duties of the state, etc. One can comprehend this among others as the denial of the idealism of Rāma, of his dutiful strivings after truth under all circumstances.

On the eighth day (after the Full Moon), the offering to the Manes is to be performed and the people act accordingly. But see the wastage of the food ! What will the dead eat[63] then ? If it were that what one eats, goes to nourish the body of another, then one might perform a funeral offering for a traveller instead of providing him for his journey.[64]

It was obligatory for the ancestor-worship for which Rāma admonishes Bharata, that the son should feed the Brahmins in office and act so as if he had fed the ancestors. In view of this the feeding of the Brahmins stands out as the principal performance. The materialistic joke of Jābāli about the transference of food to a distant place has been repeated also in *Viṣṇupurāṇa* III, 18 and in *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha.*[65] Jābāli does not mean thereby the rituals performed by Rāma on the river Mandākinī, because during this he had not fed any Brahmin as the custom was ; he had himself performed the rites to the dead.[66] Jābāli refers to the usual 8-day-ceremony on the eighth day after death[67] to be repeated every year, which, according to his opinion, Rāma should not perform now. He means perhaps : you have already performed a purposeless offering, but, now, cease to perform the additional customary rites without being least worried over the word of your father to Kaikeyī.

These ritual works on offerings are indeed written by shrewd persons : Offer ! Give away ! Consecrate yourself ! Drive away asceticism ! Abstain[68] !

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[63] Here A is the same as C ; but B : What remains of the dead ?

[64] A ii. 121.13-4 ; B 116.23-4 ; C 108.14-5.

[65] Cf. J. Abs, *Beitraege zur Kritik heterodoxer Philosophie-Systeme in der Purāṇa-Literatur*, (Festschrift H. Jacobi), Bonn 1926, p. 386 ff, further 393 f.

[66] Immediately after the burning of the corpse, Cf. Kane, *op.cit.*, iv. 209 f, 214 ; J. Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg 1896, Section 58 ; A. Hillebrandt, *Ritual Literatur*, Vedische Opfer und Zauber, Strassburg 1897, p. 89.

[67] Kane, *op.cit*, iv. p. 353 ff.

[68] A ii. 121.15 ; B 116.25 ; C 108.16.

At the end of the chapter on materialism in *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, the materialist argues again in a similar manner, that the Vedic rites have been invented by the weaklings and fools as the means of maintaining their livelihood[69] ; that specially the rites for the dead were prescribed by the Brahmins as means of subsistence which was already taunted by a pessimist in a "gossip" of the priests[70] in the *Ṛgveda* X. 82.7. This argument of Jābāli has hardly any influence over Rāma. He, who yields easily to the ancestor-worship due to the traditional argument, is meant by Vālmīki to be indeed the hero in what follows.

Therefore, hold fast to the decision that there is no world beyond, rely on what is visible and leave the transcendental behind. Follow the opinion of the authorities which the whole world accepts. Take the charge of your kingdom and make Bharata accord well with it.[71] The version B expresses it clearly : Stick to the idea that there is none (Daśaratha) beyond. Version A : Follow the opinion of the materialists[72] – Jābāli observes : Accept your father as lost, as transformed to nothingness and as beyond obligations. Seize power without fear of the other world, or, of the punishment of hell for your father (in case, you do not fulfil his promise).

As opposed to Lakṣmaṇa, Jābāli the materialist does not, thus, advocate in favour of force. Basically, he does not speak anything against the "truth", against keeping the promise. He does dwell on the fact that Daśaratha wavered tragically between the fulfilments of two contradictory promises. He overlooks the human weakness of the grey-haired king and the young Bharata. He briefly treats only the political motive of the act without any reference to the pure moral scruple and primarily contends against Rāma's viewpoint, which he poses directly against that of Bharata, that the good son must save his father from hell through rituals. Against this prompting of conscience of the pious Rāma, Jābāli puts forth his materialistic world-outlook, denies the supra-sensuous, the other world and the sanctity of the holy scriptures with arguments typical of the materialist, to be repeated later on, which were presumably not the personal invention of Vālmīki but were found by him in the tradition of the polemics against the materialists.

Unfortunately, Rāma the idealist does not, in his reply, at all enter into Jābāli's arguments. He does not take these seriously and snubs Jābāli that he says so to have Rāma's favour[73] as a flatterer and courtier. While the world runs after the desires,[74] he would, as befits a king, like to take a lead on this earth as a model of virtue. Truth is the goal of all morals, the root of all and the lord of the world and on it the Vedas rest. The protector of the people and kinsmen stands, of course, alone ; alone he attains to heaven or hell (as Jābāli himself emphasises). But Rāma would not destroy the dam of truth out of delusion, greed or ignorance. He would renounce the Kṣatriya code of conduct which are immoral though having the semblance of morality. Only the mean and the wicked run after it.[75]

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[69] This verse is also cited by Nīlakaṇṭha on *Mahābhārata* xii. 218. 25.

[70] Cf. Ruben (Note 28 above), 1955, p.22.

[71] A ii. 121.16, the next verse is absent ; B 116.26-7 ; C 108.17-8.

[72] A 16 : anāstikaparām (?).

Rāma here confronts the materialist with a hymn on "Truth". To the idealists of ancient India truth is not a mere category of theoretical knowledge, viz. the exact reflection of reality, as with our philosophers ; to them it is also reality itself beyond all bare appearances, though the line of demarcation between the two cannot be sharply indicated. This truth, however, is to be regarded as Spirit, God, the Absolute, the unique reality in the natural and moral sense of the term, a direct and effective magical power. *Satya* (truth or something true, i.e., something real) is a synonym of *ṛta*. And since the oldest Vedic times, it signifies the cosmic course of all happenings, of which man forms a part. The subjective truth of man must remain, in his thoughts, words and deeds, in harmony with, or even be identical with, the reality, the inevitability of the cosmic order. The word of the father becomes a reality (truth), which the son must fulfil (translate into reality) ; the world-order should not be disturbed. The world-order is indeed conditioned by the deeds of people, with reward or punishment magically determined by good or evil doings in the course of the soul's wandering. It is at the same time a fanciful play of God. Gandhi[76] also contends that truth is God and he enjoins his followers 'to stick to the truth', i.e. to abide by 'truth', to harmonise their behaviour with that mysterious truth, and that at every step of life, even in political boycott, etc.

Vālmīki does not narrate here the controversy between the materialist and the idealist. On the contrary he places side by side in a rather unconnected way the contentions of both, and this in such a manner that the common listener as a

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73. B 118.2 ; C 109.2. The corresponding parallel passage in A is presumably included in the canto A 122, which has been omitted due to misprint. (See below, note 96).
74. *kāma* : B 9 ; C 9.
75. B 13-19 correspond to C 12-20.
76. N. K. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi* Ahmedabad 1948, p. 4.

practical man would definitely decide in favour of the materialist. For it was everybody's wish that Rāma must be king. Any naive person would wonder at the idealism of Rāma and at the same time feel that Rāma, as an unconscious tool of fate, has to go to the forest and kill Rāvaṇa.

As designed by Vālmīki, Rāma should remain high above the common run of the princes and nobles (Kṣatriyas), who, like the common people,[77] are subject to passions such as love, anger, etc.[78] Already in the *Atharvaveda* (iv. 32) is sung the wrath of the warriors ; and the peace-loving people are afraid of the anger of kings (vi. 40). And in the *Yajurveda* the Brahmins have been posed against the Kṣatriya who "commits much what is unholy and impure ; he eats what is in no way food, he rebels against the Brahmins".[79] In Kauṭalya's Polity one Bharadvāja appears as a defender of anger and desire of the despots.[80] It is said in the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*[81] that the materialists adhere only to political and erotic teachings. In the 10th century A. D. Somadevasūri, a Jaina, teaches in his *Nītivākyāmṛta* : "Materialism is the best means for carrying out the transactions of this world"[82] ; and Kauṭalya adduces it[83] as the third system of philosophy along with Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and thus does not deny it at the outset.

Accordingly, Rāma here does not basically at all condemn the materialism of Jābāli as such, but only places himself above the general practical morals of his status,—the morals which were also directed in their own way not to the world beyond but to this-worldly ideals and appeared to him, to Vālmīki and to the later pious Hindus as materialism. But herein is also a sort of unconscious acknowledgement of the practical morals of the materialists, who allow themselves like Jābāli does here to be led rightly into practical life from practical considerations.

Vālmīki himself seeks to justify Jābāli in a notable way. As Rāma abuses Jābāli, the famous Brahmin Vaśiṣṭha appears as his defender and explains to Rāma that Jābāli too (and not Rāma alone !) knows the ways of the world ; he has still spoken thus (materialistically) in order to induce Rāma to come back.[84] Vaśiṣṭha next cites the genealogy of Rāma from the creation of the world in order to prove thereby that Rāma should ascend the throne as the rightful heir, as has been done by the first-borns throughout his dynasty.[85] As a preceptor of Daśaratha as well as of Rāma, he demands of him duty-bound obedience[86] and as such he should act accordingly as his relatives, his mother and his brother Bharata ask of him. Rāma answers briefly that he would abide by his allegiance to the father.

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[77] *Mahābhārata* xii. 188.7.

[78] *Ib.* 11.

[79] Mai, S. I., 8, 7. According to W. Caland, *Das Śrautasūtra des Āpastamba*, Goettingen, Leipzig 1921, p. 195.

[80] Kauṭalya viii. 3 (129).

[81] Ed. V. Sh. Abhyankar, Poona 1924, p. 2.

[82] According to M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, iii. Leipzig 1920, p. 529.

[83] Kauṭalya, i. 2.

Bharata now takes recourse to the desperate means, *upaveśa* : he prostrates himself and fasts to force Rāma to yield. But Rāma scolds him for such a behaviour, which does not behove the sworn chieftain (Kṣatriya). At this, Bharata turns to the people. The people, however, assert that Rāma is right to hold fast to his promise. At this moment, the heavenly beings who had been observing the quarrel between the brothers eulogise them along with their father. They appeal to Bharata that he should think of the father and accept Rāma's decision, so that Rāvaṇa could be killed ; it is their desire that Rāma should remain for ever as free from guilt before his father. Then they vanish and Bharata follows their behest. He finally carries home the sandals of Rāma to place these on the throne. Thus ends this great episode of the second book.

To do justice to Jābāli and his materialistic argument, at least three more questions are to be discussed.

1) Does Jābāli belong to the original work of Vālmīki or is he a later interpolation ? H. Jacobi, a great authority on the *Rāmāyaṇa*, comments : "The definite refusal[87] of Rāma to return to Ayodhyā and his decisive remark *pravekṣye daṇḍakāraṇyam aham apyavilambayan/ābhyāṃ tu sahito vīra vaidehyā lakṣmaṇena ca//*[88] has to agree fully with Bharata's threat to force him through *pratyupaveśana*. The impact of this threat is much weakened because of the intervening speeches as we find them ; of these, that of Vaśiṣṭha in 110 is a downright absurdity in this context because the sudden decision of Bharata appears to be totally unmotivated." With this Jacobi wishes to strike off four chapters (in the C version 107-111, 11).

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[84] A ii. 123.1 f ; B 119.1 f ; C 110.1 f.

[85] *Ib.* A 32 ; B 33 ; C 36.

[86] A 124.4 ; B 120.4 ; C 111.4.

[87] The speech to Bharata, see above.

[88] A ii. 120.16 ; B 115.16 ; C 107.16.

As such, Jābāli's speech, too, in C 108 stands scratched. First, it is in palpable contradiction to the tradition of all manuscripts of all versions.[89] Therefore, this "interpolation" must have been inserted in a hypothetical text before the shaping of the archetype of our manuscripts. Secondly, that Vaśiṣṭha's argument about the hereditary succession of the ancient princes is "a downright absurdity", is only an imaginary verdict, which, on closer examination of the structure of the second book of the epic, has as little a ground as the assertion that Bharata's decision of fasting "appears to be totally unmotivated." Jacobi seeks, under the influence of Lachmann's theory of ballads, to discover a very concise *Rāmāyaṇa* and is led by this tendency to reach here a hasty conclusion.

2) The second question is concerning the structure of the second book in order to find out the place of the materialistic speech so that it becomes understandable. The treatment clearly falls under two heads, before and after the death of Daśaratha. It is a matter of the privileges of the harem before his death, of state politics after his death.

At first Kaikeyī drives Rāma against the promise. Then Rāma goes to his mother and in her apartment Lakṣmaṇa declares his proposal for applying force ; after that Kauśalyā claims of Rāma the obedience of a son and threatens him with fasting. Against this the chief argument of Rāma is fatalism, which, however, Lakṣmaṇa does not allow. Thereafter comes a series of eulogies to Sītā who wishes to accompany Rāma without intending to exert her influence on him for keeping his promise. Next come the people into picture ; they threaten that they would migrate to the jungle. They have no chance to speak to Rāma ; they merely grumble as passive spectators. Their expressions, therefore, do not prevent us from considering this first part of Book ii as family-intrigue, because the conversation is further carried on in the lady-chamber where Rāma, Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa bid farewell.

In the second part, Kaikeyī's son Bharata takes the place of Kaikeyī as it were. He is the first to speak, though he wishes to cancel Rāma's banishment through his mother. Jābāli and Vaśiṣṭha support him. Vaśiṣṭha claims of Rāma the obedience of a disciple just as Kauśalyā in the first part demands that of a son.

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[89] Jābāli's speech is absent in the citation of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in *Mahābhārata* iii. 277. 3-39 and *Raghuvaṃśa* xii.1-19, which do not prove anything because of their brevity ; similarly in the Indonesian versions (W. Stutterheim, *Rama-Legenden und Rama-Reliefs in Indonesien*, Munich 1925, pp. 14, 76, 156).

As Rāma does not pay any heed even to Vaśiṣṭha, Bharata threatens him with fasting in the same way as Kauśalyā does in the first part. On further examination of these parallels between the second and the first part, Jābāli's materialism corresponds to the violent threats of Lakṣmaṇa. Lakṣmaṇa's attitude is basically far more pitiless than that of Jābāli, if we compare the two situations,—particularly at the time when Lakṣmaṇa demands the life of the grey-haired Daśaratha. Rāma's chief argument lies now in his exaltation of "Truth", against which Jābāli (in contrast to Lakṣmaṇa's rejection of fatalism in the first part) has no answer, as little as Vaśiṣṭha has. Thus the poet of the epic has this concept of "Truth" much more near his heart than that of fatalism. Against this "Truth" the idealist Vālmīki could not and would not naturally invent a reply.

After this, as in the first part, the people come again into the picture for a short while ; but they now see that Rāma is in the right. They move together with Bharata, Jābāli and Vaśiṣṭha and thus are placed here by the poet with a special purpose. In order to convince once for all the Brahmins and ministers together with the family of mothers, wives, etc., Vālmīki lets the heavenly beings pronounce their final verdict. This royal gathering is thus to be convinced only through the divine authority, this *deus ex machina*. They side with the materialist Jābāli, who represents political reasoning, which, as designed by the poet of course, must stand by all means as a background to the super-human idealism of his hero Rāma with his stand, as dictated by fate, to kill Rāvaṇa.

Upon such an analysis of the events, it becomes clear that the poet brings the materialist Jābāli in a pre-planned situation. He speaks at a critical situation, not during the happenings in the family, but in the second part, in public before the people and the court, as Rāma would even like to fulfil the promise of his father, who has expired meanwhile, that Daśaratha might not suffer in hell. And now the materialist interferes and speaks against the superstitions concerning the other-world and ritualism. He, however, is allowed to have as little influence on Rāma as the idealist Vaśiṣṭha with his legitimate claims has. Rāma at all events is bound to retire to the forest and fulfil his fate.

With reference to this problem of the structure of the two parts, there remains further a secondary point on textual criticism to be clarified. The depiction above follows the South Indian versions. In the Bengali version there is a variation. It is night when Bharata, after coming to the forest, offers him sovereignty, informs him of the death of his father and lets him perform the rites for the dead ; and the long speeches of Bharata along with those of Jābāli and Vaśiṣṭha follow on the next morning. According to both the North Indian versions, however, Bharata speaks in detail on the very first day, the people admire Rāma[90] and Rāma answers him[91]; and Jābāli speaks too. Rāma answers briefly[92], then the night falls.[93] And on the following morning Bharata speaks once again. The Bengali version relates it thus : "As Rāma hears the speeches of Jābāli and Bharata, he answers Jābāli and so forth".[94] Since in the impression of the North-West Indian version, a stanza here is lacking[95], which should have contained Rāma's answer to Jābāli ; and since a stanza is lacking in the version A, which conforms to the description of night and morning in the Bengali version,[96] and since however in the A version there is no such description in the place of the South Indian version, the North-West Indian version here, is certainly corrupt. It is however the same with the Bengali version, as it is incoherent that Rāma should answer Jābāli in the morning when he has already spoken in the evening, whereas Bharata speaks in the morning. That the North Indian versions are here in disorder is attested by the fact that in the table of contents at the beginning of the Book I of the Epic which is lacking in the South Indian version, they declare that after the funeral rites, a speech to Rāma is to be described in details—under this head a speech of the two, Jābāli and Vāmadeva.[97] But there is no mention of Vāmadeva at this place of Book II.

3) Thirdly, Jābāli's character is to be investigated. Only in the South-Indian version Jābāli is first mentioned during the description of the court of Daśaratha. In the northern and southern versions, two sacrificial priests (Vaśiṣṭha and Vāmadeva) and eight *amātyas* (ministers : Sumantra, Jayanta, etc.) have been introduced.[98] Only in the southern version are mentioned also "others"-viz. Suyajña, Jābāli, Kāśyapa, Gautama, Mārkaṇḍeya, Dīrghāyus and Kātyāyana as his

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90. B 114.36 ; C106.34 ; is absent in A.
91. A 120 ; B 115 ; C 107.
92. B 116.41 ff ; absent in A & C.
93. B 117 ; C 105 ; perhaps it was included in the canto A 122, which was wrongly omitted in the edition. See below note 96.
94. B 118.1.
95. A 122 is lacking.
96. H. Wirtz, *Die westliche Rezension des Rāmāyaṇa*, Bonn 1894, p. 28 ; A 122 corresponds to C 109 and B 118 ; B 117 is absent in A.
97. A i. 3.38 ; B 4.38 cd-39 ab.
98. A i. 7.1-3 ; B 7.1-3, C 7.14.

mantrin-s (advisers).[99] Thereafter all are praised in a body with an exuberance of ornamental epithets, in course of which there is no mention of Jābāli's materialism. Later on, when Rāma wishes to perform a horse-sacrifice to have a son, he sends for the preceptors (*guru*-s), namely Suyajña, Vāmadeva, Jābāli and Kāśyapa and the priest Vaśiṣṭha.[100]

During Rāma's wedding, Daśaratha mentions as participants the names of Vaśiṣṭha and Vāmadeva (both the priests), Jābāli, Kāśyapa (northern version also adds Bhṛgu), Mārkaṇḍeya, Dīrghāyus and Kātyāyana.[101] This is somewhat in agreement with the first list.

Only in the northern version of the second book, Daśaratha, while complaining of his breach of promise, asks : What will Vaśiṣṭha and Vāmadeva, Jābāli and Kāśyapa, say to it[102] ?

After Daśaratha's death these persons meet together and are referred to in the northern version as authorities on kingship while in the southern as king-makers : in the northern version—Vaśiṣṭha, Vāmadeva, Jābāli, Kāśyapa, Mārkaṇḍeya, Gautama and Maudgalya[103] ; in the southern version—Mārkaṇḍeya, Maudgalya, Vāmadeva, Kāśyapa, Kātyāyana, Gautama and Jābāli.[104]

Only in the northern version are introduced Vaśiṣṭha and Jābāli as those who persuade Bharata lamenting over Daśaratha not to mourn, as the tears of the bereaved survivors overthrow the dead from heaven.[105] The *Bhagavadgītā*, too, as is well-known, is from the very beginning[106] against the customary mourning. And if Jābāli here has the same opinion as Vaśiṣṭha, he appears here not at all as a materialist. It is to be specially noted, however, that these two are here mentioned together, because this situation does not last long before Jābāli's speech to Rāma, which is defended straightaway by Vaśiṣṭha in spite of its materialism on account of its honest purpose.

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[99] C. i. 7.4 d-5.

[100] A i. 9. 45 ; B 11.9 ; C 8.6-same as 12.5 cd-6ab.

[101] A i. 65.4 ; B 71.4 ; C 69.4.

[102] A ii. 37.19 ; B 34.21.

[103] A ii. 73.2 ; B 69.2

[104] C ii. 67.3

[105] A ii. 85.20 ff ; B 81.20 ff.

[106] Cf. similar viewpoints of the ancient Greeks and Romans cited in *Handwoerterbuch des deutschen Maerchen,* ed. L. Mackensen, Berlin-Leipzig 1930-1, i.p.84.

Now, as Bharata returns home with Rāma's sandals, Vaśiṣṭha, Vāmadeva and Jābāli lead the way.[107] In all these passages, Jābāli belongs to the close circle of persons around the king Daśaratha.

But purposively, he is absent among them in both the northern versions when Bharata, after Daśaratha's death, summons together[108] for advice Sumantra, Jaimini, Vāmadeva (in version B-Suvarṇa) and Jaya (in version B-Vijaya). Further, according to all the versions, Vaśiṣṭha sends as messengers to Bharata[109] only Jayanta, Siddhārtha, Aśoka (and Vijaya in the southern version), but not Jābāli. Even if this or that passage is ignored, this grouping shows that Jābāli is quite familiar with the poet but also that he does not come forward traditionally as a unique personality with a peculiar, somewhat materialistic world-view, except in our passage.

An observation in the southern versions fits in with this. Rāma's reply to Jābāli's materialism is repeated in the southern version in a metrical form, which is certainly indicative of later interpolation. To this Jābāli answers indulgently with "something true, idealistic and wholesome" : I do not advocate the arguments of the materialists nor am I a materialist ; there is nothing at all which is nothingness (i.e. there is surely a world beyond, etc.). With an eye to the situation, I become again an idealist and I can sometimes become a materialist again. The eventuality arose and I spoke as a materialist, so that you may return home to please us.[110]

It was thus the purpose of the poet that Jābāli was not consistent in his materialistic preachings. A Cārvāka of such conviction could have persuaded neither Daśaratha nor Rāma, Vaśiṣṭha or Bharata for a long time in the court. Only in the special situation confronting Rāma and Bharata could materialism play a role in order to bring Rāma away from his idealistically moral but politically false path.

Thus Vālmīki introduces Jābāli at this place as a sort of tempter. Lakṣmaṇa and others are also tempters, but Lakṣmaṇa recommends the path of force, the usurpation of the throne against the will of the father who is still alive. This moral is not in keeping with Rāma's idealism, but it is heroic and so far as Kṣatriyas are concerned not altogether unworthy. Jābāli, however, rejects not only the pure moral but, with a subtle suggestion (if the commentaries are right), also the royal exertion of force,—the striving for political-success. So only the path of lust is left as the only desirable one. Thus Jābāli resembles very closely the seducer in the *Daśakumāracarita* viii, who dissuades a young prince from his studies and pursuit of state-politics and leads him to excesses till he is conquered by a neighbouring king.[111] It thus becomes clear that Rāma accuses Jābāli of speaking only to please him,[112] which means he speaks as a lackey, flatterer and tempter and as such Rāma is not supposed to keep his word and accept the kingdom.

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[107] A ii. 126.2 ; B 124.2 ; C 113.2.

[108] A ii. 86.11 ; B 82.11.

[109] A ii. 74.5 ; B 70.5 ; C 68.5.

[110] C ii. 109.37-9.

It is indeed a matter of really unusual situation. For, it was usual of the despotism in the slave-maintaining society of ancient India that the princes waited anxiously for the death of the father as they did not have the patience to wait to ascend the throne. As such, the works on polity had to discuss the question how the father should protect himself from his sons. In the court of Ayodhyā, however, not only the eldest and the rightful heir Rāma but also his brothers Lakṣmaṇa and Bharata wish to retire to the forest. All the three are "noble", i.e. self-less, in a superhuman sense. In this matter Rāma is consistent from the beginning; Lakṣmaṇa at first protests against it with his suggestion of force; Bharata revolts against the intrigue of his mother only out of irresolution and humility. Lakṣmaṇa allows himself to be won over quickly by Rāma's idealism. Bharata however yields only to the words of the heavenly beings. Vaśiṣṭha wavers; at first he is for Bharata's coronation in accordance with the words of Daśaratha and Rāma. But afterwards, he supports even Jābāli and absolves him of his materialism, till he too changes his opinion presumably through the influence of the heavenly beings again. The character of Jābāli does not stand out as sufficiently clear. He must have been one of the many average Brahmins at court: and as such he must have studied polity. In the single instance where he appears, he advocates materialistic arguments, without entering into the teachings of polity; indeed, if we understand rightly, he recoils from the political task and advocates only pleasure. As such any prudent man of politics would condemn him. But when he holds on to his medical conception of birth, he poses as a good materialist, because even to-day a dialectical materialist does not do better in such a situation. Whenever he advises to do away with superstitions and to seize the power, he recomends the only practical and right solution to the existing political conflict. But the poet needs him only as a foil (as Lakṣmaṇa, Kauśalyā, Bharata and Vaśiṣṭha) so that the idealism of Rāma stands out radiating all the more. But in the sense in which Rāma appears to the European reader of to-day as super-humanly moral, inasmuch as even the greatest poet cannot shape such an idealised hero with human warmth, in the same sense appear to us the foils of Rāma as men of practical thought and sympathetic and among them also the materialist Jābāli.

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[111] W. Ruben, *Die Abenteuer der zehn Prinzen*, Berlin 1952, p. 25 f.

[112] B 118.2; C 109.2.

This explains why the great Vālmīki portrays the materialist Jābāli as much more polite than the militant Lakṣmaṇa, by no means through malice, with which, otherwise, the materialists are portrayed in idealistic literature. He even allows Vaśiṣṭha to be on his side, and shows thereby that he has an understanding of humanity which hardly any other Indian poet has.

Translated by
PARESH CHANDRA MAJUMDAR

On The
Tattvopaplavasiṃha
of
Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa

—An Agnostic Critique of Knowledge—

WALTER RUBEN

R. 4

Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi, the learned editor of the text, is justified in claiming that Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa belongs to the school of Bṛhaspati, because he quotes him and him alone with reverence.[1] One may add that he does not at all recognise the other well-known trends of philosophy in preference to Bṛhaspati's materialistic teachings, although he does not seek to defend it positively. He opens his text with an announcement of the title : *tattvopaplava*, i.e. annihilation of all *tattva*-s or all realities or categories. He makes a pretext that it has been indeed taught (by Bṛhaspati[2]) : "Now, therefore, we shall explain reality (*tattva*). Earth, water, fire and wind are the realities.[3] Their combinations are termed body, sense-organs and object, etc."[4] This clear materialism of Bṛhaspati, however, does not professedly contradict Jayarāśi's teachings of 'the annihilation of all realities', particularly because of the 'objective of reflection', which is intended. The elements, earth, etc., would be reflected in these teachings of Bṛhaspati so far as these are known in the world (*loke*), i.e. in the world of the laymen.[5] "But even these,—the elements,—cannot be taken as real if these are examined critically, not to speak of the other realities". (He obviously means the atoms of the Vaiśeṣika, the primeval matter of the Sāṃkhya, the soul, god, etc.).

Now, if an opponent asks as to how far these universally recognised realities will be annihilated i.e. shall not exist, Jayarāśi answers : "The evidence of the existence of the instruments of valid knowledge depends on their right definitions ;

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1. *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, ed. Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. Rasiklal C. Parikh, B.A. (Hon), Baroda 1940. (Gaekwad Oriental Series, lxxxvii), p. xi f.
2. Ib. p. xii.
3. cf. the similarly formulated first *sūtra* of the Vaiśeṣikas : *athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*.
4. cf. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iv. 2.1 : *tat punaḥ pṛthivyādikāryadravyaṃ trividhaṃ śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñakam*.
5. This passage is explained by Sukhlalji, p.xii, in a different way. The matter is not reflected in the materialistic philosophy, by Bṛhaspati "is merely reflecting in his statement the belief of the people". I take it as Bṛhaspati's teachings reflect the matter without analysing it philosophically. This materialism of Bṛhaspati thus represents natural science, which is wanting in India and which reflects the matter while the materialistic philosophy of its teaching is an abstract of the natural sciences.

the evidence of the existence of the objects of knowledge (e.g. the elements earth, etc.) depends on the instruments of valid knowledge. In default of the instruments of valid knowledge, how can the objects of knowledge be taken as objects of correct expression (or practice) ?"

As it continues, after a lacuna in the manuscript, "the soul could as well be attributed with colour or a jar with intelligence". With this intention he composes his work, which shatters to pieces the then prevalent idealistic definitions of all instruments of valid knowledge.

In this introduction, the materialism of Bṛhaspati is represented in a somewhat obscure way—as an obviously unphilosophical reflection of matter,—and thereby a unique conception of reflection as a kind of knowledge is introduced as justified in a certain sense.

Accordingly, Jayarāśi is presumably a Bārhaspatya. But his work is nevertheless not a materialistic one ; it is rather anti-philosophic and in a definite sense agnostic. It denies, without representing any positive materialism, all the idealistic definitions of the various instruments of valid knowledge with which the author is familiar, such as perception, inference, etc., with 'pure'—i.e. apparently logical—argumentations, while the other materialists[6] of ancient India known to us admit the validity of perception. With this our author denies at the same time, as he expressedly says,[7] all the prevailing philosophical knowledge of the objects, such as of the elements, and therefore, of matter. That is to say, he turns away from any sort of philosophising, from the definitions of all the schools (except that of the materialist in the above-mentioned sense), without himself representing the materialistic or idealistic teachings, but at the same time without denying the existence of matter or the possibility of practical life.

He quotes at the beginning of his work[8] "the knower of the summum bonum" (*paramārthavid*, and thereby he presumably refers to Bṛhaspati[9] again) that one should follow the worldly path, because with reference to the ways of the world (of the daily life) laymen (*bāla*) and the wise (*paṇḍita*) are the same.

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[6] But Sukhlalji has commented on this in p. iii that Śrīharṣa called the followers of Bṛhaspati as Cārvākas who did not recognise any instrument of knowledge and thus they agree with Mādhyamikas and Śaṃkara. On this similarity we shall return later.

[7] Jayarāśi as in note 1.

[8] Ib. p. 1.

[9] cf. Sukhlalji p. xii—Jayarāśi p. 125, line 15, emphasises that he has composed his book for the attainment of a great purpose. Is this "purpose" which is twice mentioned, the *artha* of the *Arthaśāstra* ?

Therefore, men may lead the usual life, think, etc., but all philosophising is false. He refers back to this at the end of his work[10] and exclaims that he has now nullified all realities and categories, but at the same time all the modes of expression or behaviour (whose definitions he has shattered) could be admitted, if one takes them without analysis. Thus is rejected with a sham proof by our agnostic the nature of the materialistic criterion of practice, which had been theoretically treated by Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (circa A.D. 400) and afterwards by the Buddhist logicians of Dignāga's school.

Vātsyāyana introduces his commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* with the following : "Successful activity results when the object is cognised by the instrument of valid knowledge. Hence the instrument of valid knowledge is invariably connected with the object. There is no cognition of object without the instrument of valid knowledge ; without cognition of object there is no successful activity. On being aware of the object with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge, the knower wants either to get it or avoid it. His specific effort, prompted by the desire of either getting or avoiding (the object), is called activity, whose success again lies in its invariable connection with the result (*phala*). One who thus exerts, being desirous of getting or avoiding the object, either gets it or avoids it. By object is meant pleasure and (objectively) its cause as well as suffering and its cause. Those objects of the instruments of valid knowledge are innumerable, because the species of living beings are innumerable".

Uddyotakara, commenting[11] on this, rejects all sorts of sophisticated pretexts. But Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa does not enter into all these. On the other hand, he starts the rejection of this criterion[12] with the denial of the definition of Vātsyāyana : "The success of the activity is its invariable connection with the result ; results are garland, sandal, women, water, etc. ; because these are real and causes of results ; that is why these are called results (i.e. enjoyment). The success of the activity is, therefore, based on the fact that it is connected with the body (the enjoyer). Activity is thus the motion which pre-exists (inheres[13]) in the body. Its success determines the rightness (of the instruments of knowledge). But is this criterion of success known or unknown ? If it is unknown, how can one know of its existence ? If, on the other hand, it is known (the question arises), how can the knowledge of its invariability be known ?"

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[10] Ib. p. 125, line 11f.

[11] *Nyāyavārttikam*, ed. Chowkhamba Sans. Series, p. 3, line 13 ff.

[12] Jayarāśi, p. 3, line 9ff.

[13] But Jayarāśi in p. 7, line 12 ff rejects the concept of *samavāya*.

Thus the question arises[14] : Is it known through sense-perception or through inference ? It cannot be the first, because it is supra-sensuous. Nor is it the latter, because then one should have to perceive a special characteristic, by means of which one could infer.

Further, the validity of the previous knowledge of water is confirmed by obtaining water.[15] Now, is it concerned with the obtaining of

(i) water that was thus known, or
(ii) water of the same nature, or
(iii) water later originated from that known water ?

(i) The first is illogical, because the previously known water has no permanence but flows away (before it can be obtained through activity[16]) according to the law of motion of particles, which results from the movements of fishes and buffaloes.

(ii) To the second alternative the answer is that sometimes people obtain water even when they have not attained a correct knowledge of water ; for in that case this incorrect knowledge should have been eventually proved to be correct. Now, if one argues, that false knowledge as contrasted with right knowledge does not lead to the attainment of the water in the same time and space,[17] then (the answer is) the knowledge issuing forth from the words of a dying person, or the knowledge of the moon, the sun, the stars, the constellations, etc., becomes also false (since the dying person attains nothing nor is able to lead another to attain anything and none can ever attain the heavenly bodies). Besides, one cannot attain the water in the same time and place as the place, like the water, may be destroyed (i.e. may change before one can attain it).

(iii) The third alternative is illogical, as finished objects[18] (basically in accordance with the definition) can be no cause : a water as something finally produced cannot produce another water, just as a pot cannot produce another pot. Besides, there is no multiplicity of water, as has been shown elsewhere[19]. Water differs from not-water inasmuch as it has the form of water. How can it differ from that which has the form of water? Is it through the form of water, or through another form (i.e. through the form of not-water)? In the first case, the form of not-water gives way to other waters. In the second case, it would itself have the form of not-water; thus one cannot distinguish between the known water and the water obtained later.

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[14] Jayarāśi refers back here to p. 2, line 5ff.

[15] cf. *Nyāya-bhāṣya* i. 1. 4 : the water of a mirage leads us astray.

[16] See Dharmottara, 4.8 ff ; 12.16 ff.

[17] Similarly, in Śrīharṣa, see note 56. Cf. S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. ii, Cambridge 1932, p. 133.

[18] *antyadravya* ; cf. the definition in *Nyāyakośa*.

Further: Is the validity of the previous knowledge said to be proved through the success of the (later) activity known through a characteristic which necessitates an inference, or is it directly perceptible and as such proved? In the first case, one cannot know the connection (between the characteristic, i.e. the success and the knowledge). But if one could know it, the success of the activity becomes unnecessary (since then one would have directly known the connection between the knowledge and the water and thus would not have to wait for the activity). In the second case, the reply is that a contact (as, according to the Nyāya view, for every perception a contact is necessary between the sense and the object) with the knowledge previously born and immediately destroyed is not at all possible. A sense-perception of the past knowledge is as illusory as the vision of a tuft of hair[20], because it can as little be the object of perception. One cannot perceive the absence of knowledge as an object of perception, nor the existence of the past knowledge, because it exists no more. One should then recognise something non-existent as the object of perception. But how? In so far as it imparts the form[12] or as endowed with the attributes like dimension (*mahattva*) etc.[22], or through its sheer existence, or through simultaneous origination with knowledge[23]? Whichever of these contentions of the functioning of perception may one accept? How can one accept the past knowledge of perception? In case one accepts it, nonetheless one must seek a

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19. See Jayarāśi, p. 5, line 11-16.
20. The tuft of hair is an old topic since *Nyāyasūtram* iv. 2.13. cf. E. Fraüwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin, 1956, p. 360ff, on the perception of the 'whole' in the teaching of Vasubandhu.
21. Jayarāśi, p. 52, line 15ff.
22. cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtram*, iv. 1.6 on the dimension etc. of objects.
23. cf. Jayarāśi, p. 56, line 20ff.

cause for it, as in the case of the false knowledge of the tuft of hairs. If one champions the sheer existence of the (knowing) soul as such, it follows that every knowledge is false. And our doctrine of the nullification of all realities or categories holds good.

With such meaningless hair-splittings, Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa exposes in fact the uselessness of all his polemics. A better criterion than that of practice has not been found till today by science and epistemology. He who rejects it opens wide the door to illusionism.

Contrariwise, the illusionism of the Buddhistic Vijñānavāda[24] is, however, rejected : In your view the object, e.g. blue, is unique. It produces on the one hand the knowledge "blue" while on the other the perceptual object "blue" (i.e. the unique real splits itself in previous perceptual knowledge into a subjective and an objective phenomenon[25]). But how can the product be a dual one ? By means of a unique form, or a variety of forms ? In the first case, it gives rise to the faulty inference that all products have one and the same form, i.e. the one becomes a unity as well as a plurality (and that becomes an aspersion on the teaching due to contradiction, which our agnostic seems to recognise here temporarily to suit his purpose). In the second case, the unity is destroyed due to the variety of forms. If the original unity is destroyed, one does not need to content, as youdo, that the one generates a manifold product.

From the standpoint of science today, too, the Buddhistic illusionism is to be rejected, but not with such dilemmatic terminology as the agnostic here uses. These tests of his methods of argumentation might have once been necessary. If we make a short resume, he avoids both the fundamental aspects of a philosophy of materialism and thereby establishes the idealistic philosophy and rejects materialism. In any case, he overlooks that there is the philosophy of the scientist between the knowledge of the layman and that of the philosophers. Thus he becomes a cynical agnostic with reference to the knowledge of reality, so far as it prevails over the knowledge of day-to-day life. He does not understand that materialism by its nature is a philosophy.

Thus this work is based on an anti-philosophic—and therefore also on an anti-materialistic—standpoint, because matertalism is indeed a philosophy. A similar standpoint is represented by the Bārhaspatyas and Auśanasas already in

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[24] The illusionism of the Vedānta was in those days certainly not yet formulated very clearly.

[25] cf. Fraüwallner, op.cit. p.329f., 371f., 396ff.

Kauṭilya's polity[26] round about 300 B. C. They have equated philosophy with

entism", which appears to be very similar to that of the Jainas and cannot fit in with any positive formulation in philosophy.[31] Thus it is also expressedly different from the agnosticism of Jayarāśi.

Corrigendum

Numbering after page 32 is faulty.
The text, however, is continuous.

Nāgārjuna, later in the second century A. D., uses a clearly thought-out agnostic—or, as some say, nihilistic—method to defend systematically his extreme Buddhistic idealism[32] and its problems. He can, in a certain way, base himself on the Buddha who withheld from his students some apparently very deep wisdom. Nāgārjuna postulates various grounds—e g. that all phenomena have a cause and hence they are not absolutely real, or that all human concepts are relative and thus not absolutely valid—to show that everything except the Buddha (equated to cause for it, as in the case of the false knowledge of the tuft of hairs. If one cham-

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[26] W. Ruben, The Beginning of the Epic Sāṃkhya, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, vol. xxxvii, 1957, p, 174ff.

[27] cf. J. Dahlmann, *Das Mahābhārata als Epos und Rechtsbuch*, Berlin 1895, p.216ff.

[28] *Nyāyasūtram*, i.2.3. cf. Caraka, Vimāna, 8.28 ; Dasgupta, op.cit. I. 302.

[29] *Nyāyasūtram*, iv. 2.48.

[30] Mbh. ed. Sukthankar, 1955.

[31] W. Ruben, *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*, Berlin, 1954, p. 107.

[32] ibid. p. 228ff.

unity as well as a plurality (and that becomes an aspersion on the teaching due to contradiction, which our agnostic seems to recognise here temporarily to suit his purpose). In the second case, the unity is destroyed due to the variety of forms. If the original unity is destroyed, one does not need to content, as youdo, that the one generates a manifold product.

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Kauṭilya's polity[26] round about 300 B. C. They have equated philosophy with religion, which is understandable according to the Upanisadic idealism prevalent in those days. They, however, do not in any case recognise that philosophy has two fundamental directions, the idealistic and the materialistic.

Some Vaitaṇḍikas who are referred to in the Epic[27] perhaps thought likewise and possibly also Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta of the Buddhistic canons. *Vitaṇḍā* is, at least in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, defined as a form of discussion in which one advances all sorts of sham arguments in order to demolish the opponent at any cost, though it dispenses with the presentation of its own thesis.[28] This mode of argumentation is recognised expressedly in the *Nyāya-sūtra* as sometimes justified, e.g. when a good purpose can be reached thereby.[29] Corresponding to it is *Mahābhārata* ii. 36. 4f, where *vitaṇḍā* is regarded as not to be criticised as it is highly efficacious, by which with learned discussion a lean thing is proved to be fat and a fat thing lean. This is done during the horse-sacrifice of the Pāṇḍavas in the palace of Aśvatthāmā (*Mahābhārata* vii. 61.13[30]). Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, however, teaches an "indifferentism", which appears to be very similar to that of the Jainas and cannot fit in with any positive formulation in philosophy.[31] Thus it is also expressedly different from the agnosticism of Jayarāśi.

Nāgārjuna, later in the second century A. D., uses a clearly thought-out agnostic—or, as some say, nihilistic—method to defend systematically his extreme Buddhistic idealism[32] and its problems. He can, in a certain way, base himself on the Buddha who withheld from his students some apparently very deep wisdom. Nāgārjuna postulates various grounds—e g. that all phenomena have a cause and hence they are not absolutely real, or that all human concepts are relative and thus not absolutely valid—to show that everything except the Buddha (equated to

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[31] W. Ruben, *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*, Berlin, 1954, p. 107.

[32] ibid. p. 228ff.

Nirvāṇa) is empty. Nirvāṇa is the only reality which, however, lies beyond all concepts and possibilities of knowledge. Nāgārjuna next asks himself as to with what justice he, being an extreme sceptic of this type, is at all entitled to discuss.[33] He denies the reality of an opponent and of his teachings and thus virtually disavows the teachings of the Buddha. He does not believe in proofs and thus does not in fact even seek to prove his nihilism itself. In particular, he turns himself against the validity of the instruments of knowledge with the statement that these do not hold good in 'the three times', neither before nor after nor as simultaneous with its object, and that one has the necessity of finding a proof for every proof and another proof for it again, and thus come to an infinite regress. Further, the knowledge of a piece of cloth is inexact, more exact is the knowledge of the threads etc., and this *ad infinitum*.

Against him, the *Nyāya-sūtra* advances very solid arguments.[34] Nāgārjuna's line of argument is later advanced further by Buddhapālita (Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika) in the fifth century A. D. In the middle of the sixth century A.D., Bhāvaviveka (Svātantrika-Mādhyamika) opposes him inside the school of Nāgārjuna. But Candrakīrti, in the seventh century, seeks to follow Buddhapālita's method of agnosticism, the method to drive all opponents to absurdity, without advancing any proof to justify[35] his own thesis. About the turn of the fifth-sixth century, the Brahmanic logician Uddyotakara, on the other hand, sometimes advances comparable sophistry against the definitions in the logic of Dignāga.[36]

He shatters, e.g. the concept of *kalpanā*[37], which is the fundamental concept for Dignāga's definition of perception. (H. Jacobi seeks to compare it with the spontaneity of understanding according to Kant). Dignāga advances the view that the pure sense should be devoid of *kalpanā*. And Uddyotakara asks, what is it ? Dignāga defines it as connection of sense-impression with name, form, etc.[38] Uddyotakara asks, but what sort of a thing can then be cited as standing for the name

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[33] ibid. p.230.

[34] ibid. p. 230ff.

[35] cf. T. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, Leningrad, 1927, p.87ff; Dasgupta, op.cit. II. p. 164 ; Fraüwallner, op.cit. p.221ff.

[36] On Uddyotakara, cf. Ruben, op.cit. p. 252ff.—According to Fraüwallner, Dignāga lived between 480-540 A.D. : op.cit. p.390.

[37] *Nyāyavārttika* 41f.

[38] *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, ed. H. R. Rangaswamy Iyengar, Mysore 1930, p.15.

'sense-perception' ? Is it sense-perception ? But, then, it should indeed be cited with the name. Is it something other than the sense-perception ? But, then, the word sense-perception loses all import. The opponent could reply that by the word sense-perception the form of perception, but not the individual perceptions themselves, are cited. But is the form different from the individual products, or not ? If it is different, the word sense-perception does not refer to the individual sense-perceptions; if it is not different, then the form is the same as the individual product of sense-perception. And then this would be connected with the word, which should not be, according to Dignāga's definition. Dignāga naturally means it be otherwise, namely that the perception of a colour which in reality is something unique is not to be connected with the general name blue etc. without its concept overlapping the pure sense-perception. Uddyotakara perhaps knows this. But he advances here a sophistry which is later similarly used by Jayarāśi, though not of course with regard to a similar problem.

Dharmakīrti opposes Uddyotakara in the seventh century. Against Dharmakīrti and philosophers of other tendencies, however, fights our Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa in the same manner as that of Uddyotakara, Buddhapālita, etc.

Jayarāśi[39] asks Dharmakīrti e.g., what he means by *kalpanā* ? Is it : (i) the knowledge which is produced through the specialities as attributes, motions, generalities, etc. ? (ii) Or, a knowledge which produces memory ? (iii) Or, has *kalpanā* the form of memory ? (iv) Or, is it to be produced through memory ? (v) Or, is it the manifestation[40] of the connection of the pure sense-impression with a sign ? Somewhat fully he repeats the fifth[41] after he shatters the first four alternatives. Is *kalpanā* a knowledge which has the appearance[42] of connection of the sense-impression with a sign ? This connection can be either real or unreal. In the first case, it will not be *kalpanā*, i.e. no fiction. On the other hand, this real connection would be as valid as the knowledge of a colour, etc. In the second case, the question is : how can then the knowledge appear in this form ? Jayarāśi continues with similar hair-splittings through six further alternative explanations of the concept *kalpanā*. The fifth, which is just dealt with, corresponds, however, to a certain extent, with the definition which Dharmakīrti himself offers : *kalpanā* is a definite knoweldge as a "mental reflex"[43], which is able to become connected[44] with a sign. In a sensible debate, Jayarāśi would have cited this definition of his opponent word for word and and then refuted it. It is not clear whether he himself thinks out the ten other alternative explanations of *kalpanā* in order to refute them or whether he quotes them from other Buddhistic writings.

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[39] Jayarāśi p. 32, line 5ff; see Uddyotakara in note 37.

[40] *nirbhāsa*.

[41] Jayarāśi p. 33, line 20.

[42] *pratibhāsa* ; cf. *pratibhāta* in Jayarāśi p. 3, line 17 etc.

Some of Jayarāśi's view-points find place in Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti. If Jayarāśi mentions in the discussion of the criterion of practice that the water attained through activity cannot be the water of the moment of past knowledge, but that the right knowledge makes us attain water in the same time and place, then Dharmottara certainly makes a pretext of the same sort. If the opponent gives in that one attains the object of a definite place and form[45] but not of definite time, Dharmottara allows it to a certain extent. The times of the knowledge and the attainment are different. But nontheless one attains the same object which one has known for a definite time, because one sees indeed the want of difference and knows therefrom that it is the one and the same in the chain of the continuous moments following one another. Dharmottara believes indeed in the momentariness of all appearances.

Thereby, the age of our author is known to be as somewhere near the eighth century A.D. A Buddhalogist can perhaps arrive at more definite conclusions with the help of Tibetan and Chinese texts. Thus he belongs to the same century as the Buddhist Śāntarakṣita (a commentator of Dharmakīrti[46]) whose argumentation against the contentions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, the Jainas and the Upaniṣads on the topic of the eternal soul[47] are similar to those of our author and are directed against the same schools, though Jayarāśi turns against the proofs of a soul while Śāntarakṣita against the idea of the soul itself. In any case, it is comparable that Jayarāśi in his refutation of the idea of soul of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not recognise the inherence of knowledge, feeling. etc., as attributes of the soul and asks whether the connection of the soul with these so-called attributes could not be understood as the *causa materialis* and its product.[48] Śāntarakṣita discusses the same possibility.[49] In the refutation of the Upanisadic teachings of *ātman* which is the eternal bliss, Jayarāśi emphasises the possibility of the *ātman* to be free and mature also in *saṃsāra*, so that the strivings for liberation are unnecessary.[50] Śāntarakṣita[51] argues in fact on similar lines. However, the dependence of one author on the other cannot thereby be proved and the definite chronological relation between the two is yet obscure.

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[43] *pratibhāsa.*

[44] *Nyāyabindu*, ed. Stcherbatsky, Leningrad 1918, i.5 ; the above translation follows freely that of Stcherbatsky (*Buddhist Logic* ii, p. 19). Jayarāśi has expunged "*yogya*" and has not equated *pratibhāsa* with *pratīti*, if Sukhlalji expresses rightly ; he has not noticed the similarity with *Nyāyabindu.*

[45] *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* 4,8ff; Stcherbatsky (op.cit. ii.9) has, however, translated *prāpaya* as "distinctly cognised" and thereby follows the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* 12, 16ff. He does not know Jayarāśi, who interprets *prāpaya* in our sense, inasmuch as Dharmottara does from 3, 5, where he deals with *arthakriyā* in the sense of *loka.*

[46] Fraüwallner, op.cit., p. 255.

[47] cf. Dasgupta, op.cit., ii. 178 ff on this polemic. In it one argument against the Jainas is lacking.

Śaṃkara, who cares little for theories of knowledge but sometimes attacks the Vaiśeṣika concepts in somewhat the same way as Śāntarakṣita[52], belongs to about A.D. 800. The agnostic and often the elaborately meaningless method of Jayarāśi and his predecessors—specially Nāgārjuna—is basically established by Śrīharṣa, a follower of Śaṃkara, in his voluminous work *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*[53], about A.D. 1150. Like Jayarāśi, he too attacks all the important definitions of his time and turns himself specially against Nyāya.[54] He argues, e.g., thus : that everyone meets sometimes something camouflaged which he cannot see and yet rightly recognises it, or blunders into a right conclusion, that one cannot thus define knowledge as the product of valid perception or inference.[55] Jayarāśi uses a similar argument among others in his denial of the criterion of practice.[56]

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48. Jayarāśi p. 74, line 21.
49. *Tattvasaṃgraha*, ed. E. Krishnamacharya, Baroda 1926, verse 191.
50. Jayarāśi p. 81, line 15ff.
51. *Tattvasaṃgraha* verse 330f.
52. Dasgupta, op.cit., ii. 189ff.
53. Ib. ii.133 ; see note 6.
54. Ib. ii.127, 133, etc. ; Vedānta and Nyāya were the chief antagonists in Indian feudalism.
55. Dasgupta, op.cit., ii. 133 : one guesses, e.g., rightly what another conceals in his hand, or rightly infers from fog (instead of smoke) the fire which is behind a hill (which is incidentally there).
56. See note 17.

Not only the Bārhaspatya Jayarāśi but also the famous Buddhist and Brahmanic Vedantic idealists have incidentally thus practised agnosticism of this type.

In this way, a definite sophistic-agnostic-antiphilosophic tradition comes down through more than a thousand years and our author is to be placed as belonging to this trend to certain extent ; but the difference of his argumentation in several instances is also to be noted. Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa specially invents for himself a bagful of points of opposition and hairsplittings, but he lets alone the basically established idea of the general relativity of all concepts of Nāgārjuna and his school and the general argumentation against the concept of instruments of knowledge.[57] He declares with pride at the end of his work that his arguments have not come under the purview of Bṛhaspati.[58] As Jayarāśi's agnosticism does not hold good philosophically, so is this claim of originality unfounded and the sign of pettiness. Accordingly, Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa does not play a famous role in the history of Indian philosophy and it is also a fact that only a single manuscript of his writing is preserved. The references to it are also rare. Had his writing been materialistic, it would not certainly have been preserved. Thus we have indeed no epistemological materialistic writing of the ancient Indians at all.

Translated by
HARIDAS SINHARAY

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[57] A few are used when Jayarāśi in p. 2 ff deals with the concept of *avyabhicāri* in the *Nyāyasūtram*.

[58] Jayarāśi p.125, line 13.

THE BIBLE
AND
PURĀṆA

WALTER RUBEN

R. 7

Both the Bible and Purāṇa have for their main theme the construction of history. Besides many individual motives are common to the two though they differ from each other in numerous details. Both begin with a cosmogony and an account of the creation of beings. Naturally in the Purāṇa there are no parallels to Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel.[1] According to both the texts life was at first heavenly.[2] Next originated tyrannical beings[3] and after that all life was annihilated through a Deluge, in India through a conflagration. After that came a man, Noah—in India Manu—the first ancestor of all men.[4] In the Bible follows the list of the Patriarchs from Noa's son Sem to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, to his twelve sons. In the Purāṇa, however, follows a longer list of many more generations from Manu's sons Ikṣvāku, Śaryāti, etc. ,to Pururavas, Yayāti and his five sons up to Nahuṣa, Duṣyanta, Bharata and others. In Egypt developed next from the seventy members of the great family of Jacob 600,000 men of the twelve families of Israel[5] in the course of 430 years. They usurped the Kanaans and thrived in that land. From the five sons of Yayāti and other heroes originated certain families whose history however is not evident so much in the Purāṇas as in the Veda. As contrasted with the Bible, there was in India the Vedic tradition[6] along with the Puranic. The Puranic tradition dealt above all with the genealogies of the warring gentry, the Kṣatriya caste, and not of the Families. But in the Bible the warring gentry, which is understood by us mainly as the Judge[7] of the Families, was not so important that its genealogies could be laid as the foundation for the description of the history of the people of Israel. Through the centuries of the epoch of the kings, the Judge is followed by Saul, David, Solomon and his successors till the two states of Israel were subjugated by the Assyrians, Babylonians and Persians. In the Purāṇa in the course of the genealogies of the leaders of the Families, who are already called kings, follow the lists of the kings of states, as the kings of the Kali Age (the last of the Four Ages), generally extending to the Guptas about A. D. 300.[8]

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[1] See under note 88, seven *ṛṣi*-s.

[2] See under notes 52 & 87, unreaped harvest.

[3] I Moses vi. 4. Vena, see under note 64 ; Ahriman, see under note 53.

[4] See under Appendix I, Manu & the Deluge.

[5] II Moses xii. 37 & 40. Cf. the counting on Sinai IV Moses i & iii. 22ff.

[6] See under Appendix II.

[7] *World History in 10 Volumes* (from the Russian) i, 558, Berlin 1962 : Jugde means the gentile artistocracy, the chosen leader in peace and war.

At the end of the Bible appears the Holy Christ who, according to Christian interpretation of a few passages of the Old Testament, was already prophesied by Joshua, David, even Jacob.[9] His biography—from the prophecy and birth to the Crucifixion and his return to His Father in heaven—is a text complete by itself. It corresponds to the biography of Kṛṣṇa in some of the Purāṇas, which biography has its place before the kings of the Kali Age. It is also a complete text, from the prophecy and peculiar birth to the death of this lonely holy person through the arrow of the hunter Jaras, after he was stripped of his nobility, and his return home to Viṣṇu in heaven, for he had descended to the earth as his partial incarnation.[10] With Christianity began a new religion having Jewish and extra-Jewish sources. A parallel is to be found in Hinduism, where Kṛṣṇa founds a new religion from Vedic and extra-Vedic sources[11], as contrasted with the Vedic religion. As the Christians derive their holiness from that of their patriarch Juda, so do the Hindus derive their holiness from the patriarch Yadu. Thus during the first centuries after Christ, both the world-histories were completed.

Certain details : In the Biblical geneolagy the most important line is that of Juda. He was, however, not the eldest son of Jacob. The eldest was Ruben,[12] who was guilty in the eyes of his father[13] and was disinherited by him.[14] Along with the other sons of Jacob he was given over to his jealous wives, Lea and Rahel, and their maids Bilha and Silpa.[15] In a similarly important place of the Puranic family-tree, Yadu and other sons of Yayāti were given over to his jealous wives Śarmiṣṭhā and Devayānī.[16] Puru, and not the eldest son Yadu, was recognised as the heir by the father. Yadu, like Ruben, was guilty before the eyes of the father and was disinherited.[17] Puru became the first ancestor of the later king Yudhiṣṭhira, the chief hero of the *Mahābhārata,* while Yadu became that of Kṛṣṇa, the chief hero of the *Harivaṃśa,* who could not become the king because of his guilt against Yadu, the first ancestor.[18] As in the Bible, in the Purāṇa too this was not a mere case with a single dynasty, as that of Yadu, but of the two branches of the lunar dynasty, and even of the solar dynasty along with it, where emerged, as another incarnation of Viṣṇu, Rāma, the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa.*

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[8] Ruben, *The Purāṇic Line of Heroes*, IRAS, 1941, 247 ff towards the end ; D. R. Mankad, *Vālmīki-Rāmāyaṇa*, iv. 39, Baroda 1965.

[9] Joshua vii. 14 ; I Chronicles xvii ; O. Eissfeld, *Einfuehrung in das Alte Testament*, 409f, 729, Tuebingen 1964.

[10] Ruben, *Kṛṣṇa*, Istanbul-Zuerich 1943.

[11] Ruben, *Einfuehrung in die Indienkunde*, 201ff, Berlin 1954 ; see under note 81.

[12] cf. the quarrel between Jacob and Esau over the first birth-right, I Moses xxvii.

[13] He slept with Bilha, the concubine of Jacob. I Moses xxxv. 22.

[14] I Moses xlix. 4ff.

[15] Ib. xxix. 31fl.

[16] W. Kirfel, *Das Purāṇa Pañcalakṣaṇa*, 385, Bonn 1924 : Devayānī gave birth to

Another detail : After the death of his eldest son, Juda gave his widow Thamar to his second son for levirate and as he also died without issue, he impregnated her himself with children.[20] This story of Thamar travelled to India and through the Turks and Boccacio to Shakespeare.[21] Levirate plays also a role in the case of Ruth and Boas, the late successors of Juda. Her son Obed was the grandfather of David.[22]

In the Puranic genealogy, in Puru's dynasty, Satyavatī, the widow of Śāntanu, requested in fact Bhīṣma for levirate to generate an heir, as both her sons, Vicitravīrya and Citrāṅgada, were dead. Being under the vow of asceticism, Bhīṣma requested the Brāhmaṇa Vyāsa who generated sons in the widows of the dead Vicitravīrya.[23]

Without probing into the question of historical truth of the Bible or Purāṇa, it can be contended that the dealing of such problems of succession corresponds to the same primitive rite of levirate in Israel and India,[24] which could build up genealogies with religious and moral sanction. And such female types as Thamar and

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Yadu and Turvasu ; similarly also in p.407 ; Mbh i. xc. 9 ; both these men are mentioned together in the Ṛv [K. F. Geldner, *Der Ṛgveda,* part iv, p. 127 Cambridge (Mass) 1957.]

17. Ib. 387ff, 407ff.
18. Ruben, *Kṛṣṇa* 131f. In reality Kṛṣṇa originated from a kingless aristocracy.
19. See under Appendix III.
20. I Moses xxxviii.
21. Ruben, *Ende gut, alles gut,* 135ff, Belleten (Ankara) 1943.
22. Ruth iii. 22 ; I Samuel. xvi. llff ; Matthew i. 5.
23. Mbh i. lxxxix. 49 ; Kirfel, *op.cit.,* 554
24. Manu ix. 59ff ; P. Thomas, *Indian Women Through the Ages,* 125ff, Bombay etc. 1964 ; V Moses xxv. 5.

Ruth,[25] Sarah and Rebecca, on the one hand, and Urvasī and Śakuntalā on the other,[26] brought into both the family-trees various traits, though differing in details.

To trace two more parallels : The offering of Isaac by his father Abraham was hindered by God. Abraham had already given up hope of obtaining a son, when God prophesied to him the birth of Isaac.[27] This may be compared to the offering of Śunaḥśepa by his father.[28] Further, the abduction of Sarah, Abraham's wife, by the king Abimelech, and her restoration after God spoke to Abimelech in dream,[29] may be compared to the abduction of Tārā, wife of Brāhmaṇa Bṛhaspati, by the king Soma, and her restoration through the God Brahmā.[30]

In the Bible the law-books of Moses and Joshua were incorporated while in India the law-books of Manu and others were preserved outside the pale of the Purāṇa.[31] Similar is the case of the collection of old proverbs. The proverbs of Solomon have a place in the Bible, while similar proverbs were independently composed in India with a similar world-view.[32] More than a thousand cultural songs of the Aryans are collected in the *Ṛgveda* (c. 1000 B.C.), which are not included in the Purāṇa, while the contemporary songs of Israel, as that of Debora[33] and the Psalms,[34] which have a similar purport, were incorporated in the Bible. But neither in the Bible nor in the *Ṛgveda* or the Purāṇa are the songs of praise of kings preserved, though there existed such, as is evident from the references. The extant texts are priestly in character.[35] In India as well as in Israel, sometimes the kings instead of priests worship their gods, as David and Śaryāti do.[36] In both the countries, young poets sometimes bragged that they had composed new songs.[37] In both the countries there are proverbs with which the women were sanctified in marriage.[38] Further, in both there is a wish for harmony.[39] But in India (in the *Ṛgveda* and Purāṇa) the songs of lamentation of the people[40] before the altar are lacking. These songs became later the Book of Songs of the Jewish guild,[41] while the Vedic songs were only sung by the priests, as there was no Vedic or Puranic guild.[42]

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[25] O. Eissfeld, *Wahrheit und Dichtung in der Ruth-Erzaehlung*, 110. 4, Sitzungsber. d. Saechs. AdW, Phil-Hist, Berlin 1965.

[26] cf. Ruben, *Kālidāsa*, 53ff, Berlin 1956 ; Kirfel, *op.cit*, 355ff, 539.

[27] I Moses xxii.

[28] Ṛv i. 24-30 ; Ruben, *Waldabenteuer des indischen epischen Helden*, 58ff, Berlin 1962 ; Kirfel, *op.cit*, 365, very briefly.

[29] I Moses xx.

[30] Ṛv x. 109. 5 ; Kirfel, *op.cit*. 352ff; Ruben, *Kṛṣṇa*, 17.

[31] But the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* is incorporated in the *Agni* and the *Garuḍa Purāṇa*, H. Losch, *die Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, Leipzig 1927.

[32] Ecclesiastes i. 8 : the eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear filled with hearing. cf. Kirfel. *op.cit*, 396, verse 89, 408f ; Mbh i. lxx. 693 & lxxx.840 (according to Sukthankar) ; Manu ii. 94f : The lusts are never satisfied, —patience, self-control, reason, carefulness, absence of jealousy, etc.; Proverbs i. 2ff, xix. ll, xxiii. lff ; this has been recommended also in India.

[33] Judges v ; Eissfeld, 134. The contents and the style of the war-song of Debora is to be compared with those of the battle of ten kings (Ṛv vii. 18 ; 33; 83).

Both in the Bible and the Purāṇa, many fables, fairy tales, sagas and stories are inserted.[43] Thus, e.g., the Bible has the saga of the pub, "the height of the baked jaw," with which Samson threw away the jaw-bone of the baked ass with which he had killed the Philistines.[44] This is comparable to the the "downfall of the kids" of that passage where king Jarāsandha killed his kids.[45] The Bible mentions some such sagas about stones erected by the Patriarchs. In the

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34. The Ṛgvedic songs to Varuṇa are to be compared specially with the Psalms ; this god punishes the sinners (M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, i. 71, Leipzig 1909).
35. Eissfeld, 132ff ; his self-conscious eulogies of the chiefs correspond to the famous *dānastuti*-s of the Ṛv (Macdonell-Keith, *Vedic Index*, i. 336).
36. cf. the *Sarvānukramaṇī* (T. Aufrecht, *Die Hymnen des Ṛgveda*, ii. 511, Bonn 1877)—*Mānava* means Cakṣu, Nahuṣa, Nābhānediṣṭha, Śāryāta. These poets were Kṣatriyas.
37. Ṛv. i. 61 ; Psalm cxliv. 9.
38. Ṛv. x. 85 ; Ruth iv. 11 ; I Moses xxiv. 60.
39. Ṛv. x. 191 ; Psalm cxxxiii.
40. Psalm xliv, l, lxxiv, lxxix etc. ; Eissfeld 151f ; also Babylonian.
41. Eissfeld 141.
42. See under note 86 : alien to the people.
43. Eissfeld 48ff ; Ruben, *Kṛṣṇa*, 260f.
44. Judges xv. 15ff.
45. Ruben, *Kṛṣṇa*, 215—according to Mbh.

Purāṇas are also to be found numerous stone cults which are undoubtedly pre-Aryan in origin—specially of Śiva with his songs of the pub.[46]

In trying to prove such similarities between the Bible and the Purāṇa, one has to assume that some of the details like the story of Thamar, the Deluge or the Four Ages[47] had wandered from some unknown place to India and Palestine. Moreover, the wanderings of some of the motifs about the birth of Christ, the prophecy of his coming, the child murder of Bethlehem and a sort of Christ motif in the texts on Kṛṣṇa are to be assumed.[48] Such wanderings do not, however, hold good for the entire world-history of the two. The time of these connection presupposes the commercial and ideological relations between India and the middle east.[49] The Jews in exile had heard about India.[50] But the differences between the two texts are so great, the beginnings of both go back to such old times in both the countries and both the texts can be so well-explained as being of indigenous origin that such wanderings cannot be conclusively proved.

In order to solve this problem it is necessary to refer to the world-history embodied in Bandāhiśn of the Iranian priests. Though this is later by several centuries to both the other texts,[51] it is also based on equally old materials.

Though much shorter than the Bible or the Puāṇa, it begins with a cosmogony

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46. I Moses xxviii. 18 ; there, where Jacob saw the leaders of heaven ; ib xxxi. 45, where he made friends with Laban ; ib xxxv. 14, where God gave him the name Israel. But according to III Moses xxvi. 1, the erection of grinding stones as places for worship was forbidden. Ruben, *Eisenschmiede und Daemonen in Indien*, 189ff, Leiden, 1939—the Śaiva cult of stone.
47. Ruben, *Die Philosophen der Upanisaden*, 71, 109, Bern 1947.
48. Ruben, *Kṛṣṇa*, 69—*Bhāgavatapurāṇa*.
49. J. Filliozat, *Les relations exterieures de l'Inde*, Pondicheri 1956. D. D. Kosambi, *The Culture and Civilisation of Ancient Indian in Historical Outline*, 96f, London 1965. A. M. Frenkian, *Der griechische Skeptizismus und die indische Philosophie*, Bibliotheca Classica Orientalis 3, 1958, 4, 211ff.
50. Esther i. 1 ; viii 9.
51. According to G. C. Tavadia, *Die mittelpersische sprache und Literatur der Zarathustriar*, 74f, the Bundāhiśn was constructed from the middle-Persian Zend-version of the Avestan Dāma-dāt book, or newly worked out. Eventually it is a later development even in the 12th century (Ib. 82)—this note supplied by Dr. Sundermann.

and an epoch in paradise.[52] This epoch is destroyed by the wicked opponent of God.[53] Instead of the deluge or the conflagration, we find here a thaw of the snow, which is typical of the Iranian hilly land and which thaw made the land unfit for movement. Accordingly Yima saved the best animals, plants and men by placing them on a mountain[54] (*vara*). From a primeval couple originate not only the people of the earth but also the dynasties of Zarathustra and the Achaemenids. The prophet Zarathustra is the climax (as Kṛṣṇa, and not the end as Christ). His successors come after him thousands of years later as the highest priests and solvers of riddle and then comes resurrection.

In India as well as in Iran, law was codified in special texts.[55] Indeed, Bundāhiśn is nearer in spirit to the Purāṇa than to the Bible. Instead of Adam and Eve, God creates first of all seven good spirits who correspond to the seven *ṛṣi*-s of the Purāṇa.[56] The heavenly status is still godly and spiritual and without human beings. Ahura Mazda creates the primeval cow, which is to nourish the beings with the plants generated from its body.[57] In the Purāṇa, the superhuman primeval king Pṛthu conquers the earth in the form of a cow that it might nourish the beings with corn and milk.[58] Ahriman, the wicked, throws the earth over the moun-

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52. Ahura Mazda creates the world from a spiritual standpoint ; without movement or change the world remains within him for 3000 years. In the next 3000 years the sky, water, earth, plants, the primeval animals and the primeval man, Gayomart, were created. (Bundāhiśn, Dr. Sundermann). See above note 2.
53. Ahriman kills the primeval animal and the primeval man in the third epoch (after 6000 years). See note 3 above.
54. Ahura Mazda reported to the primeval king Yima that he would send a winter with snow for the annihilation of the people because of their wickedness ; for the protection against this Yima erected that mountain (Dr. Sundermann according to Videvdāt ii. 20-43).
55. The Avesta of Sasanidis contained 21 books (*nasks*) among which the 8th and 9th books contained seven rules (*datik*) of Mazda. The single nask of Sasanidis, which is available in its entirety, is Videvdāt, a book of the religious principles.
56. See under note 88.
57. Bundāhiśn iii. 14-18 ; iv; ix.
58. Kirfel, *op.cit*, 146, 240ff.

tains.[59] The primeval king Pṛthu, however, levels the earth so that it can be habitable for men.[60] Bundāhiśn and the Purāṇa deal with the four epochs covering 12,000 years and place Zarathustra and Kṛṣṇa respectively in the transition from the third to the fourth world-epoch.[61] As distinct from the Bible, none of the texts mentions the name of the countries in terms of the people. But both have cosmographic sections dealing with a "middle land," in which their religion and everything good prevail over the surrounding countries, over the famous mountains and seas or rivers.[62] The moral dualism of both the mythologies is based on the polytheistic picture from the primeval Indo-Iranian times, where there are good gods and evil spirits fighting one another.[63] But both the texts are basically monotheistic. Thus Ahriman is the evil antagonist of God. In the Purāṇa the evil and pre-human Vena is against the precursor of that good primeval king Pṛthu. This wicked Vena[64] like the primeval king Yima in Iran,[65] wishes to be respected as a God. On the other hand, the biography of Kṛṣṇa can be proved to have been fashioned after that of Kyro.[66] Both the genealogies contain above all lists of names of the warring gentry and no detailed history of the people as in the Bible and in both the distin ction between the the epochs of the patriarchs, the families and the states is not so clear as in the Bible.

Such materials indicate that it is only probable that there were numerous

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59. Bundāhiśn viii.
60. Kirfel, *op.cit*, 243, 71ff.
61. Ruben (see above note 47) 109f ; 71.
62. Bundāhiśn xi-xiii ; Kirfel, *die Kosmographie der Inder*, Bonn-Leipzig 1920 ; Bhāratvarṣa, Stuttgart 1931.
63. India : *Deva*-s against the *Asura*-s ; Iran : *yazata* against *daiva*.
64. Kirfel, (see under note 16), 235 ; similar to the Vasudeva of Puṇḍra ; Ruben, *Kṛṣṇa*, 204ff. Further Weber in Pañc. i. 5, the consolidated kingdoms in Mbh xii. 180. 17 (Critical ed.), and the child made immortal by Nāgārjuna in Kathāsaritsāgara 41, 17f ; Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, i. 386ff.
65. Accorning to the middle-Persian, *Datistan i denik* (9th century), Yima promises creation. After his disappearance (According to *Dat.* xix. 308 he lied, i.e. he gave unauthorised promise ; also *Aytkar Camaspik*, iv. 23) the glory of victory also left him and he fell as an offering to Dahak (Dr. Sundermann).
66. Ruben, Tuerkische, persische und indische Materialien zur Geschichte der Biographie, *Indoloji Araştirmalari*, 763ff, Istanbul 1941.

points in common between the Purāṇa and Bundāhiśn. This is not the case, however, between these two and the Bible.[67] Thus in order to throw light on the histories of these three countries, one must seek to explain the common points (and the differences) among the Bible, the Purāṇa and Bundāhiśn in so far as they are not based on interdependence. The Indian Āryas, Iranians and Israelites wandered in three regions of the old orient, fighting their way during the same period of the last phase of the bronze age[68] as patriarchal shepherds with a little knowledge of agriculture and craft. But the families of Israel had only small cattle. They had no horses and warchariots, which the warring gentry of the Indo-Iranians possessed. This special feature explains the genealogies of the class of warring gentry in the world histories of India and Iran.

The three pastoral peoples settled down in three regions, with old village communities and agriculture with irrigation. But the helot-like enslaving of the primitive people in the form of the Śūdra caste,[69] as the Āryas in the Ganges valley practised, was not present among the Israelites[70] and hardly among the Iranians.[71] All the three peoples came across cities, but only the Āryas destroyed these and only after centuries they founded their own cities during the iron age, which began in India later than in Iran, not to speak of Palestine.[72] All the three

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67. This holds good in general in the histories of India, Iran and Israel.

68. The Ṛgvedic Āryas about 1500 or 1200 B.C. ; the Iranians about 1000 B.C. in Tepe Sialk (R. Hauschild, *Die indogermanischen Voelker und Sprachen Kleinasiens*, 92, Berlin 1964 ; towards the beginning of the first century, R. Girshman, *Iran*, 73f, 1954 ; Israel the first half of the 13th century ; *vide World History* (see note 7 above) I. 557.

69. On this see Ruben, *Ueber die fruchesten Stufen der Entwicklung der altindischen Śūdras*, 20ff, Berlin 1965.

70. *World History, op.cit*, the previous owners of land are often turned into slaves, others vacate their land.

71. Girshman, *op.cit*, 76, the native population were gradually forced to give up their property.

72. Palestine was situated very near to the original home (Kizwadna, Asia Minor, Mitanni in the 14th century B. C.) ; iron available there seems about 1100 (Ruben, see note 46 above, p. 151; St. Przeworski, *Die Metallindustrie Anatoliens in der Zeit Von 1500-700 B.C.*, 141, Leiden 1939, in Syria about 900) ; in Iran about 850 (see note 138); in India (B. R. Subrahmaniyam, *Appearance and Spread of Iron in India*, JOS, 349ff, Baroda 1964); in the Doab it was produced in certain

warring peoples were gradually influenced by the higher culture of the older people, though they took care to preserve their own society in tact and pure in their magical culture. Though intermixture was forbidden,[73] they took over the gods like Ball or Śiva[74] of the older people. All the three peoples came with cultures without temples and idols into the regions of primitive temple religions. But such a state of remaining pure could not hold long and specially in Israel and India the temple culture was gradually established,—in Israel without the image of gods of course.

During this cultural intercourse, the Israelites first of all took over the script of the older people. Then came the Iranians and then the Indians. They did this for literary purposes.[75] Thus the Israelites could make use of old historical documents of their kings and priests for their world-history. But the Indians and Iranians[76]

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areas since the 9th century, but was used for weapons first of all since the 7th century and for massive production of weapons since the 4th century B.C.

73. V Moses xii. 2 ; II Kings x. 18ff. In the Avesta "the intra-tribal marriage" (*xvaitvadaa*) is recommended ; this rule must have been made to prevent the mixture with the conquered population, as also against the demolition of the distinction between the castes of the Aryan population (Dr. Sundermann). Similar to this is the Brahmanical prohibition of the *pratiloma*-mixture (or marriage) of a man of lower caste with the woman of a higher, while the opposite case was tolerated, though the children naturally were not recognised as belonging to the caste of the father (P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra* II. I. 51ff, Poona 1941). This rule was specially directed against the Śūdra caste, of which Iran or Israel did not know.

74. Prohibition—II Moses xx. 3-5 ; the cult of the golden calf—II Moses.xxxii. The castigation of the phallus-worshipper in the Ṛv—Macdonell-Keith, *Vedic Index* II. 382 ; J. Gonda, *Die Religionen Indiens* I. 8, Stuttgart, 1960 ; in the Purāṇa and Hinduism the pre-Aryan religion of India has penetrated, as against that mentioned above (see below note 81).

75. The literary sources of the Old Testament about 950 B.C.—Eissfeld, *op.cit.*, 181, 186, 329 ; if the theory of Arsakidiam archetype of the Avesta is right, this work must have been written (at first) in the Parthian epoch (Dr. Sundermann). Pāṇini mentions the writer (*lipikara*—V. S. Agrawala, *India as known to Pāṇini*, 311, Lucknow 1953) in the 5th-4th century B.C.

76. Eissfeld *op,cit*, 64ff.

could not do so. That is one of the reasons why the Bible became the most concrete among the three world-histories. In India and Iran, however, the priests wished to regard their 'knowledge' as a privilege and for a long time they did not allow it to be propagated through writing. A caste of priest had naturally evolved in all the three regions, the Levites, the Magi-Mobeds and the Brahmins. The old oriental society was already stratified, presumably also the Kanaans and the societies of the pre-Aryan Iran and the Punjab. Only in India there was, along with the three Aryan castes,—the Brāhmaṇa (priest), Kṣatriya (warrior) and Vaiśya (shepherd-peasant),—the fourth "non-Aryan" caste of the Śūdra-helots coming out of the pre-Aryan society of village communities with their cultivators of rice, craftsmen and shephreds.[77] Gradually India comprised of a much larger and complicated ethnic and sociological area than Israel or Iran. That is why there arose gradually many states and temples with their various traditions. Two systems of monotheism were evolved, that of Śiva and that of Viṣṇu, if one does not take into account that of the Devī. On the other hand, in Iran and Israel there was only one such system, namely, of Ahura Mazda and Jahwe. India evolved gradually not only a single world-history but, even when one does not take into account the Jainas and the Buddhists, it evolved eighteen Purāṇa-s each of which originated in a particular centre of temple propitiating one or the other of the three great gods. From fourteen out of these eighteen Purāṇa-s, the original Purāṇa with its world-history has been reconstructed by a few Indologist of the previous generation[78] and this is the ground of our investigation. With the manifoldness of the regional Indian cultures is connected the fact that the Puranic genealogy does not follow a single line, as in the Bible and Bundāhiśn, but three lines, namely those of Kṛṣṇa, Rāma and Yudhiṣṭhira, the heroes of the three epics.

The people of the old orient, as we can well presume from the example of the Sumerians,[79] had already evolved in all the three regions, cosmogonies on the one hand, and genealogies of the royal families on the other, naturally through their temple priests. But they did not combine the two materials into a single text. The Aztecs, who in the social evolution were nearly at the same stage as the Sumerians, had similar traditions, though these were written down in the form of collected texts of questionable authenticity for the first time during the Spanish regime.[80] It corresponds to a stage of development of the bronze age. Our three world-histories, however, are of the late iron age. Their monotheism is the result of the struggle of different religious tendencies through centuries in the three countries.[81] They have thus taken recourse to the so-called oriental despotism taken over from the older people which was foreign to these three peoples in their long process of simultaneous development. To this process belongs the fact that the priestly and warring castes worked together on the one hand and fought against each other on the other. That is why in each of the three societies the high priests are placed near the king.[82] But at the same time in the world-histories mighty kings have repeatedly been branded as sinners by the priests and this because of their

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[77] See note 69 above.

[78] Above all by F. U. Pargiter, *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, 1922 (New edition, Delhi etc. 1962) and Kirfel.

[79] James P. Pritchard, *Ancient Near East Texts relating to the Old Testament*, Princeton 1950.

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80. W. Krickberg, *Marchen der Azteken und Inkaperuaner, Maya und Muisca*, Jena 1928.
81. The fights among the monotheists, centralised and decentralised temple priests, prophets etc. from Moses (contemporary to the Ṛv) to the close of the Old Testament in the council of Jamnia at about A.D. 100 (Eisfeld, *op. cit.* 768f). Zurvanism and dualistic Mazdaism were only the dogmatic variants of the ruling state-church of Iran ; the movement of the Mazda-followers had a clear social character. The Nestorian and the Manichaeian churches comprised above all the depressed semitic section of the people of Iran (Dr. Sundermann). In contrast with the intolerant polytheistic and templeless Vedic Brahmins (See note 74 above) the tolerant Puranic Hindu Brahmins took over the temple and folk-cults of Śiva, Viṣṇu and Devī and came to a sort of monotheism after long social fights ; these fights were contemporaneous with the ascendance of the Śūdras from their state of helots and the fights of monarchies against aristocracies of mystics against ritualists, of Buddhists and Jainas against Brahmins, of Reformers against orthodox religions (See note 11 above).
82. The high priest of the temple in Jerusalem, the Mobed of the Mobeds along with the king of the kings (Bund. xxxiii. 2) and the *purohita* along with the Indian king.

despotism.[83] Only Samuel could basically conceive kingship as a system.[84] On the other hand the priestly editors of the three world-histories took over the worldly traditions of the warring gentry and the kings.[85]

Thus the Bible is in reality more popular in character than the Purāṇa or Bundāhiśn. The fact should be connected with the incident that Irsaels did not know such a class as the Śūdras who were outside the Vedic religion. The Bible deals in a human and lenient way with its law of the seventh day as free from work and the day in the yearly festival which removes the sin of the masses. By contrast the Brahmins were very strict about the unholy caste and thus sought to guarantee "pureness" of the few Āryas as the elite against the Śūdras.[86]

The realism of the Bible comes froms its human connection with the people, which stands in contradiction to the fantasy of the Purāṇa and Bundāhiśn. The Bible begins with Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel,—ordinary people, shepherds and peasants, the nomads of the Israel people and the peasants of the village commu-

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83. From David-Solomon—usurpers as Dahak and Frahrasyan (New Persian-Afrasyab) were conquered ; see above Yima. Notar reigned without any right, Kai Us was thrown away from his heavenly chariot. Kai Vistap was wrong towards his son Spantadat and drove him to death. Also Dara II, Yazkart I, and Ohrmazitv were disgraced. Nahuṣa, Pururavas ; Yayāti, Duryodhana and even the righteous king Yudhiṣṭhira were disgraced, Yudhiṣṭhira had once lied in dire necessity during the war and thus he came to hell and came to know that all kings must remain in hell for shorter or longer period (Mbh xviii. 3. 12 ; cf. Ruben, *Das Pañcatantra und seine Morallehre,* 223, Berlin 1959). According to the three epics Yudhiṣṭhira's brother Bhīma, Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are murderers of despots (Ruben, Waldabenteuer des indischen epischen Helden, 43, Berlin 1962).
84. I Samuel viii.
85. Eissfeld 64. Old stories from the archives.—Worldly materials were taken over in the religious version, and this was the fact in Bundāhiśn (Dr. Sundermann after I.C. Tavadia, *Die mittelpersische Sprache und Literatur der Zarathustrier*, 79-81). The genealogies were originally the heirloom of the *sūta*-s (the heralds of the gentry), and these genealogies were later taken over by the Puranic Brahmins (Pargiter, *op.cit.,* 16, 360 ; Ruben, *Studien zur Text Geschichte des Rāmāyaṇa*, 253-63, Stuttgart 1936).
86. See note 42 above. Purāṇa was foreign to the people.

nities of the Kanaans, from whom later evolved the smith and the trades people.[87] The Purāṇa and Bundāhiśn, however, begin with seven superhuman beings, i.e. good spirits,[88] the mythical creator of the beings, Dakṣa[89] and Gayomart,[90] the two being perhaps analogous. The Purāṇa has the four epochs which repeat themselves without end in cycles of world's creation and dissolution. Corresponding to these there are fourteen Manus who come one after the other in a chain and not a single original ancestor Manu.[91] In accordance with this fantasy there appear to us the patriarchs like Pururavas, Yayāti and Yadu, who, as contrasted with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, hardly appear as men. The names and descriptions of the lands of the families also lacking in Iran and in the Punjab, in contrast to the convincing stories of Joshua and the Judges. Thus Christ as a suffering man of the people is nearer to the modern man than Kṛṣṇa and Rāma, the Kṣatriyas with their fantastic fights against evil demons. Śiva and Viṣṇu, as also Ahura Mazda, are much more removed from the people than the strong and righteous Jehovah.[92] These gods are, however, the deciding powers in the priestly world-histories.

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87. I Moses iv—weaving, work of iron-smith and masonry were learned by the first men ; Bund. xv. 5f—agriculture, cattle-breeding and trade began with the ideal primitive king Pṛthu ; Kirfel, *op.cit.*, 244—previously the earth offered corns without being cultivated out of sheer magical wish ; Ibid, 238, 41. Also in the definition of economy (*vārtā*) in Kauṭalya I. 4. 1, the hand-work is not expressly mentioned along with the other three. He mentions it, however, in I. 3. 8 along with *vārtā* and sorcery (see above—the piper in the Old Testament); these are the fields of work for the Śūdra. In III. 13. 28, the peasant, shepherd and trader are mentioned as the chosen workers, but there is no mention of craftsmen.
88. Bundāhiśn i. 26—Marici etc.—Kirfel 4. 16 ; 35. 5 ; 67.62 ; 137.6; Mbh i. 59.10f.
89. Kirfel, *op.cit.*, 149. 39ff ; 178.56 ; 210.2ff.
90. Gayomart is originally a primeval demon (H. Baumann, *Das doppelte Geschlecht*, 155ff, Berlin 1955).
91. Kirfel, *op.cit.*, 254ff ; *manvantara*.
92. Jehovah establishes himself firmly with prize and punishment in the life of the Israelites, of the people in general and of the individuals in particular. But Śiva sits on the throne as a *yogī* on the mount Meru in the solitary north, Viṣṇu sleeps on the serpent Ananta in the ocean and he seldom breaks into the history in his incarnations. This is also somewhat true of Ahura Mazda, who leaves the distinction between good and evil to the men.

In spite of such strong differences, however, the Bible, the Purâṇa and Bundâhiśn are very close to one another, if one compares them with the Greek historical texts. Along with the Indians, Iranians and Israelites, the Greeks too conquered a portion of the old orient about the same time. But they could not further the tradition of the village communities, so far these had at all developed, because of the barrenness of land. On the other hand they usurped the Phoenicians through trade as against the Indians, Iranians and Israelites. The Greeks dealt specially in sea trade with wares of cottage industry and thus used, in contrast with the old orient, masses of slaves in production. They developed no despotism, no priestly class and no religious world history. Of course, Hesiod wrote in 8-7th century a cosmogony and theogony and a sort of genealogy of the gentry ;[93] but he wrote this is as a worldly poet in a time when the other three world histories were still propagated by anonymous priests through their schools. And Herodotus wrote his scientific history in the fifth century B. C., not as a mythological fight of the good against the evil but as concrete historical fights of the Greeks against the Persians. He was a great patriot of the Greek *polis* and a democratic opponent of the Persian and other oriental despotisms.

The policy of the Greeks and the completely different art of Christian humanism, which arose with Moses and the the prophets with the motto "love thy neighbours," became, after long ideological fights, one of the basic factors of socialism in Europe. The Zorostrianism has also, in the meanwhile, evolved into Islam, another heir of Judaism. In the case of Hinduism, however, the difficulty is that for the last two thousand years the motto "love thy neighbours," i.e. the ideal of altruism, existed side by side with the quietistic ideal of the ascetic in Brahmanism and thus it could not play any important role. Only in our century[94] this motto in its real significance could be recognised by Indians for the development of the real democratic society of the future in India and this happened as India went over to capitalism and industrialisation and the age-old village community in India ceased to be the basis of production in this classical land of the "Asiatic Mode of Production"

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[93] In the theogony and its continuation, the "catalogue of the wives".

[94] B. G. Tilak, *Śrīmad-Bhagavat-Gītā-Rahasya*, 109ff, 113f, 123f, 167, 182 ; II. 678 etc., Poona 1935.

APPENDIX 1

MANU AND THE DELUGE

(See Note 4 of the text)

The complex of the deluge and Manu, the original ancestor, requires a very close historical investigation. In the *Ṛgveda*, Manu appears as Father or even as 'Our Father',[1] i.e. as the father of all people, as the first man and the first who offers oblations,[2] along with other famous 'sacrificers' as Atri.[3] "Manu's child" accordingly means man,[4] or the people are called 'the folk' (*viś*) of Manu.[5] This conception may be of Indo-European origin in the final analysis. But in the *Ṛgveda* Manu is never connected with a deluge. Along with Manu are further mentioned Vivasvat, the son of Samvaraṇa, as a Manu, and another Manu called Sāvarṇi.[6] But we cannot find a connection between these. Manu is further connected sometimes with Ila, the mythological personification of the offering, but only as a sacrificer[7] and not as the original ancestor. Finally, in the later hymn (*Ṛv*. x. 73) Manu appears as progeny of Vivasvat and as the progenitor of Nahuṣa and Yayāti. These two, Manu as the son of Vivasvat (the sun) and Sāvarṇi Manu, also appear in the Puranic tradition.

In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (i. 8. 1),[8] Manu is warned of the deluge by a fish, builds at its request a ship and the fish pulls the ship on the Himālaya so that Manu is saved. Manu offers sacrifices and gains thereby Ilā ; she bears him successors, for the earlier beings are all drowned. It appears that the creator Manu, who is the original ancestor in the *Ṛgveda*, has got some connection with a variant

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1. *pitā naḥ* : *Ṛv* ii. 33.12 ; x. 100. 5.
2. H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 282ff. Stuttgart-Berlin 1923 ; Macdonell-Keith *op. cit*, II. 129f.
3. *Ṛv*. i. 139. 9. ; i. 81. 1.
4. *mānava*=man : *Ṛv* iii. 54. 1. (Geldner and Grassmann), cf. *mānuṣa*.
5. *Ṛv*. viii. 23. 13 ; vi. 14. 2.
6. *Ṛv*. viii. 52. 1. ; viii. 51. 1 ; x. 62. 11.
7. *Ṛv*. x. 70. 8 ; x. 110. 8.
8. Macdonell-Keith, *op. cit*, and *Kāṭhaka-Saṃhitā* xi. 2, translated by A. Hohenberger ; Die indische Flutsage und das Matsyapurāṇa, 4ff, Leipzig, 1930.

of the saga of deluge, which appears first in the epic Gilgamesh. Apart from India[9] the sagas of exodus appear also in other continents.[10] There are numerous variants, but a saving ship appears in all the Sumerian versions of the saga. But the helping fish, again, appears to be Indian. Utnapishtim of the Sumerians was the first man, as Manu in India. He achieved immortality. But neither he nor Manu has a detailed family-tree attached to them, as is the case with Noah in the Bible.

On the other hand, in the later Vedic literature a few more successors of Manu are mentioned, who correspond to the Puranic tradition. Thus in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* (iv. 1. 5. 1.) is mentioned a Śaryāta ; and a Śāryāta, one of his successors, is taken by the late Vedic authors of the *Sarvānukramaṇī* as the composer of a Ṛgvedic hymn, along with a few other successors of Manu-Nābhānediṣṭha, Nahuṣa and Cakṣus.[11] This children of Manu were members of the warring gentry, but in those days such priestly functions were not forbidden to the composers of religious songs. The two castes of the priest and the warring gentry separated from each other since then. As this separation was complete and the two castes were formed, only the Kṣatriyas were dealt with in the Puranic tradition, specially in the major genealogies, the *vaṃśa*-s, which laid down the line of Manu, the son of the sun, as the solar dynasty, and also the lunar dynasty.[12] As Manu was the original ancestor of the solar dynasty only, the saga of his being the original ancestor of all men could not be incorporated into the genealogy or the story of the deluge. The epico-puranic tradition, however, equated the helping fish with Viṣṇu and incorporated the saga of the deluge-cum-fish in the list of the *avatāra*-s of Viṣṇu. In the *Mahābhārata*, the saga of deluge appears in iii. 185 (but here the fish is Brahmā and not yet Viṣṇu)[13] and the genealogy appears in i. 70ff. The *Matsya-purāṇa*, however, begins with the saga of the deluge as the introduction,[14] at the end of which Viṣṇu as the fish narrates the genealogy

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9. Ruben (see note 46 above) p. 240 : among the Kharias and Kamars.
10. Ruben, *Tiahuanaco, Atacamā und Araukaner*, 55f., Leipzig 1952 ; Suryakanta Shastri, *Flood Legend in Sanskrit Literature*, if, vii f, Delhi 1950 : the version in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* is not to be traced from the Sumerian, but "in its original" is older, because it is simpler. This argument is not convincing.
11. Aufrecht (see note 36 above) ii, 511 : *Mānava*.
12. See Appendix III below.
13. Hohenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 9 ; see note 22 below.
14. *Ibid*, p. 9 ff ; H. Zimmer, *Maya, der indische Mythos*, 114ff., Stuttgart-Berlin 1936 ; Gonda, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

in answer to Manu's questions, in the same way as in the Puranic genealogy the Sūta Lomaharṣaṇa answers the question of the sagas. Thus he narrates the genealogy with its cosmogony, but without the saga of the deluge.[15] On the other hand, the genealogy in the *Mahābhārata* i. 70. 11f contains a reference that Manu is the original ancestor of 'the *brāhmaṇa*-s, *kṣatriya*-s,' etc. and thus is the basis of all people and not only that of the *Kṣatriya*-s of Yudhiṣṭhira's dynasty. In the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* ix. 31, Śaryāti is described as king and singer at the sacrifice and thus is in conformity with the late Vedic tradition mentioned above about Śaryāta, the child of Manu. In ix. 2. 23, we come across his successor Bhalandana, who is reported to have become a Vaiśya.[16] Pṛṣadhra became a Śūdra and Agniveśya became the original ancestor of *Brāhmaṇa*-s. One could presume from this that here was a relic which was unthinkable in later feudalism and that Manu was indeed the original ancestor of all people, as befitting the primitive gentile order of the *ārya*-s. The story of the deluge is yet to appear in this late Purāṇa.

In that genealogy of the *Mahābhārata* ten sons of Manu, the child of the sun, are mentioned[17] in i. 70.13f. They correspond more or less to the Puranic tradition—partly to that of the *Matsya* and the *Padma Purāṇa*-s[18] and in part to that of the *Vāyu* and the *Brahma Purāṇa*-s and others.[19] Both the groups of the Purāṇas differ from each other above all with reference to Ila, Manu's offspring, a sort of daughter and wife, who becomes, in the group of the *Matsya Purāṇa* etc., the man Ila, and whose saga is recast in a different manner in a Śaiva way.[20] However, in all these Purāṇas the deluge is not at all mentioned in this context, as also in the epic. One can thereby prove that in the epico-puranic tradition, the *brāhmaṇa* Mārkaṇḍeya, the son of Bhṛgu, is a sort of Noah, though outside the genealogy.[21]

In the Puranic genealogy a kind of flood (but no deluge, only a primeval flood before the creation of beings) plays a role in connection of the creation of the world from the primeval water. The deluge occurs during the periodic dissolution and recreation of the world. According to these floods, the creator of all beings and thereby of all men (in these floods there is no mention of a ship or any human being who survives) is not a Manu but Brahmā[22] and he is replaced readily by Nārāyaṇa, the water-god.[23] He is a form of Viṣṇu and later Viṣṇu created Manu (without a flood).[24] In a section of the Puranic tradition, Viṣṇu's transformation into fish is incidentally mentioned in brief, and later in detail, as his incarnation as the God the rescuer who again brought up the earth immersed in water (thus here also we find the over-flooding of the earth without Manu, fish or ship). After this Viṣṇu appears as the creator of new beings.[25]

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[15] Kirfel, *op. cit.*, p. 136 ff.

[16] According to the *Mārkaṇḍeya-purāṇa* cxiv. 19 this happened at once to his father Nābhāga (Yogendra Misra, *Early History of Vaiśālī*, 23ff, Delhi 1962).

[17] Vivasvat's son was Yama, his son was Mārtaṇḍa, whose son was Manu : Mbh. i. 70. 10 f.

[18] Kirfel, *op. cit.*, 340 : Ila as the first among ten sons.

[19] *Ibid*, 299 : nine sons and Ilā.

[20] See Appendix III below, on Ila-Ilā.

[21] V. S. Sukthankar, The Bhṛgus and the Bhārata, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, xviii, 1ff, specially 29ff ; Zimmer, *op. cit*, 52ff.

The Purāṇas mention not only a single Manu, but also the Ṛgvedic Manu, the sun of the son, is taken as the 'present one', the seventh in a list of 14 Manus, who have different names (among these Sārvaṇi of the *Ṛgveda* is the eighth). In the recreations of the world (*manvantara*), they play the role of the original ancestor, as our Manu does in the present epoch.[26] In each of such Manu-epochs there are seventyone world-creations and dissolutions (and each such world-creation has four *yuga*-s) Fourteen such Manu-epochs, i.e., about a thousand world-creation make a *kalpa* and at the end of such a *kalpa* all beings are burnt (in conflagration). The *dvija*-s, along with Brahmā and the Ādityas, dissolve in Hari-Nārāyaṇa and then he creates the world and the beings anew.[27] With this chapter on the *manvantaras*-s in the Purāṇa the great genealogy comes to a close. The genealogy starts with the Vaivasvata Manu, but there is no mention of flood, fish or ship.

In this passage where the *manvantara*-s come to a close, the *Harivaṃśa* brings in an interpolation,[28] which begins with the mention of a deluge (without Manu, ship or fish), and then mentions again a conflagration at the end of the *kalpa*. In the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*,[29] which, in part, is very close to the *Brahma-purāṇa* and the *Harivaṃśa*, this passage is not found. Thus this interpolation is probably a relatively later one. In the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, however, this passage if continued further, though depending largely on the *Brahma-purāṇa Harivaṃśa* and *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*. Not in the chapter on the *manvantara*-s (iii.11), however, but in its description of the incarnation of Viṣṇu, it treats him as a fish, but not as the first, as is mostly the case, but as the last in its own peculiar way.[30] Thereby Manu's creation of the beings after the flood is not mentioned. But the next chapter[31] begins with the same Manu, the son of the sun, his ten sons and the saga of Ila, though this change-over is not clarified for the reader. This order corresponds to the orders mentioned in the group of the *Matsya*, *Padma* and other *Purāṇas* mentioned above.[32]

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[22] Brahmā is the fish in Mbh iii. 185, see foot-note 13 above.

[23] Kirfel, *op. cit.* 3, 11 ; 15, 5 ; 76, 64 ; *Manusmṛti* i. 9ff ; Mbh xii. 328.35.

[24] Kirfel, *op cit*, 5, 26f : Manu Svāyambhuva ; 36, 14.

[25] Kirfel, *op. cit.*, 16, 7ff ; according to the *Padma, Mārkaṇḍeya* and other *Purāṇas.*

[26] Ib. 254ff.

[27] Ib. 272, 83ff ; specially the *Brahma-Purāṇa* v. 57ff and *Harivaṃśa* i. 8. 26ff—these colossal epochs seek to bring home the infinity of the world to the believers, and thus mystifies the world at the world at the same time. Cf. Ruben *Kṛṣṇa* 15 : the 71 cycles of four *yuga*-s each give us in each of the 14 *manvantara*-s 1000 (exactly 994) cycles of four *yuga*-s.

One is not compelled to but may form the opinion that here, between the interpolation of the flood in the *Harivaṃśa* and this loose connection of the flood and the fish-incarnation is based on the genealogy belonging to different traditions. Both the texts are akin to each other. Both are specially thorough about the episode of Kṛṣṇa and his *bhakti* and thus they are members of a chain of traditions which are connected with one another through the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*.[33] As, however, this interpolation of *Harivaṃśa* does not occur in the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* and as this Purāṇa is to be placed at the beginning of Gupta period in the fourth century A.D.,[34] this mixing of the flood, Manu and genealogy must have occurred later, in the *Harivaṃśa* perhaps a little earlier than in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, which is placed in the sixth or even in the tenth century A.D.[35] It developed thus during a thousand years after the saga of the deluge in the Brāhmaṇa and thus without any traces in between, and therefore to all appearances, is not based on a continuous tradition but later poetry or theology.

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[28] *Harivaṃśa* i. 8. 32 and 36 ; it is not mentioned by Kirfel.

[29] *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* ed. Kirfel 283, 48ff ; only 48 c d is similar to *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* 60 a b, which corresponds to *Harivaṃśa* 30 a d. 49 a b of *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* corresponds to *Harivaṃśa* 21 d ; 50 a b corresponds to *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* 61 (in Kirfel's edition of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* and *Harivaṃśa* these verses are wanting).

[30] *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* viii. 24 ; translated by Hohenberger, 12ff.

[31] *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* ix. 1.

[32] See note 18 above.

[33] W. Ruben, The Kṛṣṇa-carita in the Harivaṃśa and certain Purāṇas, JAOS lxi. 3, 115ff.

[34] See note 8 of the text.

Manu and the deluge have in the recent past been placed spiritually at the beginning of Indian mythology and thereby presumably at the beginning of Indian history.[36] According to the Puranic opinion, the year of the deluge is reckoned as 3,110 B.C. and thus it follows that the Indian flood must have been contemporaneous with the flood in Mesopotemia, which, according to Woolley, is to be placed about 3,100 B C. This deluge has been described in the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* i. 8. 1, in the *Mahābhārata* iii. 185, at the beginning of the *Matsya-purāṇa* and in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*. From Manu originated then all people and Puranic dynasties.[37] All these passages have been discussed above and it appears from this that the connection between the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* and the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* does not hold good. It is also wrong to take Manu as the original ancestor of all the Puranic dynasties.[38] He who does this bungles with the general principles of the Purāṇas which divides the genealogies of the solar and lunar dynasties and allows Ila in a matriarchal way to be the primeval mother of the lunar dynasty. This would make the solar dynasty originate in a patriarchal way from Vivasvat, the sun and father of Manu. Such a person would thus go astray definitely from the

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35. Sixth century A.D. : Mehendale in the History and Culture of the Indian people, iii. 298, Bombay 1954. According to Dr. Hazra the *Matsya-purāṇa* is still later (6-7th century A.D. ; 10th century A.D. according to S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, iv. 1, Cambridge 1949).
36. A. D. Pusalkar in the *History and Culture of the Indian People*, i. 270ff, London 1951.
37. *Ib.* 272.
38. Pargiter already (*op. cit.* 84 & 88) traced all dynasties back to Manu. He thus let off the saga of the flood, did not mention the lunar dynasty as such and named only the Aikṣvākavas of Ayudhya of the solar dynasty. In his conclusive and detailed description he has however distinguished between these two dynasties rightly (90ff). Pusalkar has also done this (*op. cit.* 273ff). After Pusalkar, P. L. Bhargava (*India in the Vedic age.* Lucknow 1955) has discussed further on this line and he is not alone. (On this : R. Mankad, *Studies in Puranic History, Genealogies and Chronology in modern Times*, 1, 3-22, *Purāṇam*, iv. 1962). Cf. Yogendra Misra, *op. cit.*, 15.

analogy of the genealogy of the *Mahābhārata* i. 70 and Vikadru.[39] He would regard the Ṛgvedic description of Vivasvat Manu, the original ancestor of all men, as the origin of the Puranic world-history.

APPENDIX II

VEDIC AND PURANIC TRADITION

(See under note 6 of the text)

Combinatin of historical materials or materials in saga-form from the *Ṛgveda*, the Brāhmaṇas, the epics and the Purāṇas are apparently very problematic. We may discuss a point in a very recent investigation of this topic (D. R. Mankad, Chronological Distance Between Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, *Journal of the Oriental Institute of Baroda*, xiv. 1, 1964, 1ff). Ghora Āṅgirasa is, according to the *Sarvānukramaṇī*, the composer of Ṛv. iii. 10. According to the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* iii. 17. 6, he was the teacher of Kṛṣṇa Devakīputra. The son of Ghora, Kaṇva by name, is said to be the composer of Ṛv. i. 36-43 and ix. 94. His successor Pragātha Kāṇva is the composer of Ṛv. viii. 1-2, 10. 48 and 62-5. Sāyaṇa[40] explains in Ṛv. viii. 1 that this Pragātha Kāṇva is the son of Ghora Aṅgirasa and an adopted son of his brother Kāṇva. Be that as it may, Kṛṣṇa would thus be the contemporary of a Ṛgvedic poet and not of the latest generation of the old period (about 1200-900 B.C.). One could thus maintain that a Kṛṣṇa with 10,000 "godless" people (*viśaḥ*) was driven to the river Aṃśumatī (Yamunā ?) by Indra (Ṛv. viii. 96. 13-5), and that this Kṛṣṇa, as he was an opponent of Indra,—as is also the case of the epic Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devakī,—might have been identical with him.[41] According to the Ṛgvedic description he was conquered by Indra. But according to the Vaiṣṇava tradition, he was the conqurer of Indra. It is difficult to believe that the fight against Indra in the Kṛṣṇa-epic was fought in a great battle with 10,000 warriors on the bank of the Aṃśumatī but it was done by the shepherd Kṛṣṇa, the bearer of the Govardhana, by himself or by the single fighter Kṛṣṇa with his discus (*cakra*), as he robbed the Pārijāta tree.[42] It is, however, not understandable that this "black",—i.e. presumably a pre-Vedic enemy of Indra and therefore of the Ārya-s,—could have been a pupil of the Ṛgvedic Ghora. On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that Kṛṣṇa, the enemy of Vedic ritualism (as evinced by the *Bhagavadgītā*), learnt from Ghora that one could determine the usual human life with its various consequences by means of rites (by which the orthodox offering in the Vedic rites become unnecessary).[43] So far as one can find out from these self-contradictory information that Kṛṣṇa lived, fought and taught in about 1,100 B.C. as a pre-Vedic hero and an enemy of Indra and the Ṛgvedic rites, is in details yet obscure and thus questionable as a whole. This is also evident from the materials mentioned above by D. R. Mankad. He reconstructs and holds against all traditions from various sources that Mainda, Dvivida, Naraka, Paraśurāma, Mārkaṇḍeya, Mucukunda, Mayāsura and some others mentioned in the sagas were contemporaries of Rāma as well as Kṛṣṇa, that Rāma was thus a little older than Kṛṣṇa. In spite of this, one must fall back upon Vedic, epic and Puranic traditions in order to reconstruct the old history of India, though not in the traditional orthodox way as J. Roger Revier (New Positions of Western Orientalism in Account with the Puranas, *Purāṇam*, vii. 2. 300ff, 1965) recommends. This should rather be done in the way of the best historians of the Old Testament or that of the historical materialists.

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[39] See below, Appendix iii.

[40] See above Mankad and Th. Aufrecht, *op. cit*, ii. 487.

[41] R. Sh. Sharma, *Śūdras in Ancient India*, Delhi, 1958 ; 12 according to D. D. Kosambi ; cf. Chr. Lassen, *Indische Altertumskunde*, i, 765, Leipzig, 1867.

APPENDIX III

THD GENEALOGIES OF THE MAHĀBHĀRATA I. 70 AND THAT OF VIKADRU

(See notes 17, 20 & 39 of Appendix I)

The genealogy in *Mahābhārata* i. 70 is important for the analysis of the history of the great Puranic genealogy. On the one hand it is a sort of precursor to the genealogy of the lunar dynasty with Kṛṣṇa in the *Harivaṃśa*[44]. On the other hand, it falsifies the history of the solar dynasty. It counts Ikṣvāku rightly among the sons of Manu, the progeny of the sun. But Ikṣvāku is not the first as in the Purāṇas.[45] As the first it mentions Vena many a time, who according to the Purāṇas,[46] is a much famous grand-child of the Cākṣuṣa Manu, who is the second Manu and thus belongs to a very remote past. Another form of the name found in the epic is Ela (who is perhaps a child of Ila, see below ; he must have been much younger). The epic continues thereafter against all Puranic traditions : the sons of Manu were opposed to one another and were all killed. Then the epic digresses into a treatment of the solar dynasty, which reaches its summit in Rāma. This is clear because Rāma, the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, was, for the composer of this section of the *Mahābhārata*, not only unnecessary but also disturbing.

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[42] Ruben (see text note 10) 105ff ; 186f.

[43] Ruben (see note 47 text) 287f.

[44] Reben (see note 33 of App. I).

The *Mahābhārata* continues further against all Puranic traditions : thereafter Purūravas was born of Ilā (Manu's daughter who was not killed along with his sons) ; she was both a father and mother to him, "as we have heard". According to the Puranic tradition, however, Ilā was the wife of Budha, the son of the moon [47] and thus the mother of that Purūravas and the original mother of the lunar dynasty of the Ailas. At the two summits of this dynasty were Yudhiṣṭhira and Kṛṣṇa, the heroes of the *Mahābhārata* and *Harivaṃśa*. From her begins the epic genealogy with the help of which the composer of the epic allows the Puranic solar dynasty of Ikṣvāku etc. to vanish and recast the Puranic lunar dynasty of Purūravas etc. as the solar dynasty. By this he could include Kṛṣṇa and Yudhiṣṭhira in it, though they according to the Purāṇa, belong to the lunar dynasty. If in the *Ṛgveda* Manu, the son of the sun, had been the original ancestor of Nahuṣa and Yayāti, he was in the Brāhmaṇas the father of Śaryāta. Purūravas, the five sons af Yayāti, Puru, Yadu, etc.,—and individual kings of the Puru dynasty like Trasadasyu—are found in the *Ṛgveda*, but Ikṣvāku and his successors up to Rāma are not found. Thus in the Purāṇas, Nahuṣa, Yayāti, his five sons, and their successors till Yudhiṣṭhira and Kṛṣṇa appear as members of the lunar dynasty, but not of the solar dynasty beginning from Manu, while in the *Ṛgveda* the members of the Ikṣvāku dynasty do not at all appear. Also in the Brāhmaṇas and the *Sarvānukramaṇī*, Śaryāta, who is mentioned as a Ṛgvedic poet along with his daughter Sukanyā, have been incorporated in the solar dynasty of the Purāṇas. A key figure in this confusion is Ilā, the progeny of Manu, the object of offering (see below). That statement "as we have heard" should naturally help to cover this falsification of the epic poet. The epic poet must have been familiar with an older version of the genealogy with both the family-trees, the solar and the lunar. But he includes Kṛṣṇa in the solar dynasty instead of that of the lunar. It is apparently difficult to contend how far he depended upon an authentic tradition as he declares to have done. It appears that Ila-Ilā was an important form which was taken over by the groups of *Matsya*, *Padma*, and other Purāṇas.[48] These hold that Manu's son Ila was transformed into Ilā through magic and was thus (as Ila, alias Sudyumna), a very unimportant king of the solar dynasty as also (as Ilā) the original mother of the lunar dynasty. She was thus responsible with her dual sex for the falsification in the *Mahābhārata* mentioned above.

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[45] Kirfel, *op. cit.*, 299 and 340.

[46] *Ibid*, 145, 15 ; 234, 11.

[47] *Ibid*, 301 ; 341.

But in the *Harivaṃśa*,[49] too, there are major contradictions to this analogy. Kṛṣṇa, in his variants in the great epico-Puranic genealogies, is to be included in the lunar dynasty, but later on Vikadru, in specific contradiction to this, treats him as a progeny of the solar dynasty, as the genealogy in the *Mahābhārata* i. 70 also does. But Vikadru puts forth another variation of this family tree than that of the *Mahābhārata* : Haryaśva, a successor of Ikṣvāku, the son of Manu in the solar dynasty, married Madhumatī, the daughter of the *daitya* Madhu. He was driven away by his eldest brother and obtained thereafter from his father-in-law Madhu the whole of his kingdom except the Madhu-forest, which was occupied by Madhu's son Lavaṇa. This kingdom was situated by the ocean and included Surāṣṭra-Anūpa.[50] At the time of gift Madhu prophesised that Haryaśva would receive the membership of the lunar dynasty of Yayāti. i.e. of the Yādavas (Yadu was indeed a son of Yayāti). In course of time Yadu was born of Madhumatī as his only son. He was captured by the serpent-king Dhumrasena whose palace stood on the ocean and received his five daughters in marriage and they bore him five sons. He divided his kingdom among them, so that Mādhava became his real heir, Mucukunda founded Māhiṣmatī as his residence on the banks of the Narmadā, Padmavarṇa ruled Sahya country, Sārasa reigned in Mrauñcapura and Hārita reigned on an island in the ocean with a flourishing pearl trade. Mādhava's son was Sattvata and his son was Bhīma. During Rāma's reign, Śatrughna killed Lavaṇa (who, as a *daitya*, have been living till then), routed the Madhu-forest and founded there the city of Mathurā. Then Bhīma conquered and resided in Mathurā. When Rāma's son Kuśa was the king, Bhima's son Andhaka was also the king in Mathurā. His son was Raivata, who was followed by Ṛkṣa and Viśvagarbha came after him. He had four sons born of three wives : Vasu, Babhru, Suṣeṇa and Sabhākṣa. Vasu's son was Vāsudeva, the father of Kṛṣṇa. Vikadru contends to have himself heard of this family-tree from Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana, the so-called composer of the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇa.

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[48] *Ibid*, 343, 41f.

[49] *Harivaṃśa* ii. 37. 2ff ; Ruben (see note 10 text) I38f.

[50] Surāṣṭra : southern people ; Anūpa : people bordering on the Vindhyas (Kirfel, *Bhāratavarṣa*, 47f, Stuttgart, 1931, according to various Purāṇa-s).

The commentator, in spite of his best efforts, cannot explain the "contradiction" that Haryaśva belongs to both the family-trees, the lunar and the solar. A Haryaśva appears, indeed, in the Puranic genealogy as one of the many successors of Ikṣvāku, without any reference to this story.[51] The division of heirloom of Yadu reminds us how in the epico-puranic tradition his father Yayāti divided the earth among his five sons, of whom Puru became his heir ; this Puru was the original ancestor of Yudhiṣṭhira.[52] Mādhava is often the name for Kṛṣṇa in the Purāṇas. He is so called in some Purāṇas[53] as a man named Madhu was one of his ancestors. The other Purāṇas, however, have mentioned neither this Madhu nor his so-called origin from the demon Madhu, the father of Lavaṇa and Madhumatī, nor have they mentioned him as the original lord of Mathurā. The *Rāmāyaṇa* relates in detail how Śatrughna, a brother of Rāma, was sent at the behest of Cyavana to kill Lavaṇa in Madhupura and how he founded the city (Madhurā) anew.[54] In a similar way, Rāma makes his two sons, Kuśa and Lava, kings of Kośala and Uttara.[55] This reminds us of the division of the kingdom among the five sons by Yadu and Yayāti. The *Vāyu* and the *Brahmāṇḍa* Purāṇas incorporated a verse in which Śatrughna, Lavaṇa, the son of Madhu and the city Mathurā, with some variations appear in the Puranic genealogy.[56] But the Purāṇas and the *Rāmāyaṇa* do not tell anything about this Bhīma. Sattvata in Vikadru's genealogy corresponds to Sattvan in the genealogy found in the common Purāṇas.[57] The Puranic genealogy includes, in contrast with that of Vikadru, Andhaka as his son,[58] and thus includes Bhīma and his rout of Mathurā, which they recognise as an invention of Vikadru. Finally, Raivata, in the Purāṇas, is not the son of Andhaka in Mathurā but the king of Ānarta, which is adjacent to Surāṣṭra-Anūpa in Vikadru's genealogy.[59] Originally, Ānarta is mentioned in the Purāṇas as the son of Saryati, who was a son of Manu and thus belongs to the solar dynasty. He settled in the land which was named Ānarta after him and founded there the city of Kuśasthalī. His grandson (or great grandson) was Raivata. He gave away his daughter Revatī in marriage to Kṛṣṇa's brother Balarāma.[60] Thus the Purāṇa connects this region (Kathiawar) with Vikadru's Surāṣṭra-Anūpa and with the family-tree of Kṛṣṇa, as Kṛṣṇa himself founded Dvārakā in Kathiawar in the place of Kuśasthalī and as the flight of Kṛṣṇa from Mathurā to the shores of the ocean is of historical import,[61] these two regions, which are much distant from each other, are connected here together. But the words of Vikardu appear to be of later construction, as in another way the genealogy in the *Mahābhārata* i. 70 is. This genealogy wanted in any case to incorporate Kṛṣṇa into a solar dynasty.

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[51] Kirfel (see note 16 text) 315, 346, 338, 317.

[52] *Ibid*, 395.

[53] *Ibid*, 420 and 430.

[54] *Rāmāyaṇa* vii. 62f.

[55] *Ibid*, 107.

[56] Kirfel, *op. cit.*, 335.

In conclusion we may mention that in *Mahābhārata* xiii. 147, Śiva being asked by *ṛṣi*-s says that Kṛṣṇa originates from Manu, the son of the sun, though in consonance with some other Purāṇas connects this in a matriarchal way with Ilā, the wife of Purūravas, the son of Budha (he is silent however about his father Soma, the original ancestor of the lunar dynasty). The description of Manu as the original ancestor of all people, of the solar as well as the lunar dynasty, however much confused in Hinduism, had been yet somehow a living tradition from *Ṛgvedic* times (see above, the end of Appendix 1).

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[57] *Ibid*, 431.

[58] *Ibid*, 432.

[59] According to Kirfel (see note 50 above), Ānarta is adjacent to Surāṣṭra.

[60] Kirfel (see note 16 text) 305f. ; 344.

[61] Ruben (see note 10 text), 6ff., specially 8.

UDDĀLAKA AND YĀJÑAVALKYA

—Materialism and Idealism—

WALTER RUBEN

R. 17

The problem of when and how philosophy in India began is of great importance. In 1954, I started the theory that the first Indian philosopher was Uddālaka Āruṇi in *Ch. Up.* vi.[1] According to my interpretation, he was a hylozoist, which means a primitive materialist. Such an interpretation must provoke criticism, because it seems at first sight impossible and is in contrast to all tradition that in the ancient Upaniṣads the doctrine of a materialist has been preserved.[2] In 1955, I published a German translation of this chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* along with other chapters from some other ancient Upaniṣads, e.g. of Yājñavalkya in *Bṛ. Up.* iii-iv.[3] In 1961, I wrote finally a paper about "the beginning of rational thinking in India",[4] describing how the fight between materialism and idealism—between Uddālaka and Yājñavalkya—began in ancient India when a few and small Indian states in the Ganges-valley had been just founded in the iron-age in contrast to the mass of tribes, when class-struggle was beginning, when accordingly, ideological competition started, visible to us in the discussions between Vedic ritualists and their opponents—as, e.g., some hermits in the forests—when others, as the Vedic ritualistic intellectuals, started opposing Indra, criticising him as a brahmicide, or when some critics attacked the main mythological teachings of the epic as regards the war of the Vedic gods against the demons. There is already recognisable some clash between Brahmins and Kshatriyas ; enlightened Brahmins like Yājñavalkya, Uṣasti, etc. protested against orthodox ritualism with its old tabus. Sciences like medicine started fighting against religion, physicists against Brahmins ; astronomy, geography, law, state-doctrine etc. began ; discussions became characteristic of this new period of ancient Indian history, doubt was in fashion in all fields of consciousness, and only then the fight between materialism and idealism began on the basis of all this social and ideological struggle, especially after scientifiic thinking had begun, although the sciences were not yet fully developed. Uddālaka shows in his philosophy this new scientific type of thinking in his ways of arguing and proving his doctrines with reasonings and analogies, as a forerunner of later logicians who developed the analyses of *anumāna*, *dṛṣṭānta*, etc.

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[1] W. Ruben, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Berlin 1954, 87 *seq.*; in my previous book, *Die Philosophen der Upanishaden*, Bern. 1947, 156 *seq.*, I had called him a realist.

[2] Cf. my review of a book *Die schosten Upanishaden* (German translation of *The Upanishads, Breath of Eternal* of the Vedānta Press in Hollywood) in *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*, 1953 Nr. 9/10, p. 462.

[3] W. Ruben, *Beginn der Philosophie in Indien*, Berlin 1955, 167 *seq.*

[4] W. Ruben, *L'origine de la pensée rationelle dans l' Inde*, *La Pansée*, revue du rationalism moderne, No. 99, Sept-Oct. 1961, 75 *seq.*

If Uddālaka was a hylozoist (primitive materialist) and the oldest Indian philosopher, as I argued, then he stands side by side with the oldest Greek philosopher, Thales, who also was a hylozoist and lived only a short time after Uddālaka. Perhaps Chinese philosophy also began in nearly the same period of the history of mankind with a similar type of materialism.[5] Thus, the world-history of philosophy might come to the conclusion that philosophy and materialism had to begin with such steps of development, there being no other traditions of philosophy than those of India, China and Europe. Side by side with the types of Ionian hylozoism—as that of Thales (water), Anaximenes (air) and Heraclitus (fire)—mankind had developed the Indian and perhaps Chinese types, and comparing and contrasting all these hylozoist-materialisms, our historians of philosophy will one day come to a proper and comprehensive definition of hylozoism and its role in the development of philosophy, namely as the first or one of the first primitive forms of materialism. In similar ways Yājñavalkya's idealism is to be compared and contrasted with Greek idealism of the Eleatics—Parmenides etc.—and the oldest Chinese idealism. In this way, the general history of philosophy helps the Indologist to understand the history of philosophy of India, while at the same time the Indologist with his interpretation of Indian materials enriches the general history of philosophy, which is the highest possible theory of history of all the different philosophies.

But was Uddālaka's doctrine really hylozoist-materialism? My revered teacher Herman Jacobi was the first to maintain that Uddālaka taught some materialistic elements. He started from the struggle between the later Sāṃkhyas who claimed that the *sat* of Uddālaka was matter (*prakṛti*) while later Vedāntins interpreted it as *brahman*.[6] Jacobi stressed the point that in Vedic mentality the distinction between mind and matter was not yet quite clear and he illustrated this fact with the help of Uddālaka's text in whose cosmogony, *sat*, *tejas* etc. were thinking and willing. Although, thus, in Uddālaka's teaching the material elements were living, although, moreover, the distinction between matter and mind was not yet quite clear, he maintained that Uddālaka's doctrine was basically materialistic.[7]

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5. It seems that the Chinese materialistic conception of *tao* was developed from something similar to *ṛta*. (Cf. Jang Ching-Schun, *Der chinesische Philosophie Laudse und seine Lehre*, Berlin, 1955).
6. In *Festschrift Kuhn*, Breslau 1916, 37 *seq.*
7. H. Jacobi, *Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern*, Bonn 1923, 11 *seq.*;

In 1940, H. V. Glasenapp quoted Uddālaka's philosophy with the same intention in order to show that the ancient Indians did not distinguish between mind and matter.[8] But in 1949 he criticised Jacobi, maintaining that this doctrine could not be labelled as materialistic philosophy because the distinction between mind and matter was not clear in that ancient period.[9] This is the reason why I, in 1954, characterised Uddālaka as hylozoist, which just means that according to his philosophy, matter was living and thinking indeed. Glasenapp in 1954 and 1956 attacked my interpretation without adding new arguments.[10] The problem is, accordingly, whether hylozoism is to be regarded as materialism or idealism (pantheism). In 1961 Dale Riepe, following my interpretation, characterised Uddālaka's philosophy as "a hylozoist and perhaps even materialistic" view of the world.[11] On the other hand, E. Zeller characterised Thales as early as 1851 as "pantheistic hylozoist", stressing the point that in accordance with the old fantastic interpretation of nature which everywhere preceded science, Thales thought everything to be living,[12] and the cosmos to be ensouled and full of spirits,[13] but that he did not teach the doctrine of a world-soul. Correspondingly, H. Jacobi already had observed that *brahman* was not mentioned in Uddālaka's philosophy.[14] In this regard Uddālaka is similar to Thales, both being hylozoists, not idealist, but rather primitive materialists.

When Jacobi and Glasenapp underlined the fact that in those old times mind and matter were not clearly distinguished, Glasenapp himself quoted Yājñavalkya describing *ātman* as mind, as *vijñānaghana*, *vijñānamayapuruṣa* etc. in

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and *Das Licht des Ostens*, ed. by Maximilian Kern, Stuttgart-Berlin-Leipzig, p. 146 *seq.*

[8] H. V. Glasenapp, *Entwicklungsstufen des indischen Denkens*, Halle 1940, 289 *seq.*

[9] H. V. Glasenapp, *Die Philosophie der Inder*, Stuttgart 1949, 126.

[10] H. V. Glasenapp, *Der indische Materialismus*, Asiatische Studien 8, 1954, and his review of my boook in ZDMG 1956, 230.

[11] Dale Riepe, *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought* ; Seattle 1961, 29. Cf. E. Frauwallner, *Indische Philosophie* I, Salzburg 1953, 90, about Uddālaka's cosmogony : it is not of the kind of an idealistic doctrine.

[12] E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* I, 1 (7th edition, Leipzig, 1923 265 *seq.*)

[13] H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* I (3rd edition, Berlin, 1912) frgm. A 1 37 (Diogenes Laertius) and A 23 (Aetius).

[14] Jacobi *loc. cit.* 1923, 13.

contrast to all other things,[15]—contrasting, thus, matter and mind as a full-fledged idealist. There is, on the other hand, in his idealism this link between mind and matter that mind is the origin of matter, as Glasenapp also held. But this thesis of Yājñavalkya does not, as Glasenapp pretends, involve that at that period the distinction between mind and matter was not yet perfect and that, therefore, one cannot differentiate between the idealism of Yājñavalkya and the materialism of Uddālaka. On the contrary, the doctrine that mind is the primary reality and matter the secondary one is typical for idealism while materialism regards nature as the primary one.[16] The doctrine of *māyā* and *vivarta* is not yet to be found in Yājñavalkya's philosophy, indeed, in so far as his idealism is still primitive, just as Uddālaka's materialism is. Everything was just developing, and what we find in the ancient Upaniṣads is just the beginning of philosophy in its two antagonistic forms, materialism and idealism.

Let us now compare and contrast both these thinkers in some details in order to show their difference in materialistic and idealistic thinking. Both, being contemporaneous, deal to a great extent with similar topics which were eminently important for the Brahmanical thinkers of that old period ; but both do so in different ways.

1. Death

Uddālaka describes a dying man,—how he loses first his mind (the faculty of recognising his relatives), then his speech, after that his breath and finally, his warmth. This is quite a rational description of death based on sound observation. It is, at the same time, in fairly good—but not quite perfect—concordance with Uddālaka's cosmogony, according to which out of *sat* developed *tejaḥ, āpaḥ* and *annam* ; *annam* becoming mind, *āpaḥ* breath, and *tejaḥ* speech. He does not mention an eternal soul or the doctrine of *karman* in his chapter on death. Mind, speech, breath and warmth enter *sat, sat* being the ultimate or first living material which is eternal, and is truth : *tat tvam asi.*

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, deals with the problem of death in several places. He teaches first how a man can become free from death by the help of Vedic priests, climbing up to heaven (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 1, 3-6). He teaches then how the body of a dying man dissolves into earth etc., the mind enters the moon, eye the sun, breath the wind, speech the fire etc., but, he adds, man himself,—his eternal soul,—is following the way of *karman* (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 2, 13). Yājñavalkya gives later on a hint that after death man's soul goes to Indra in the heart, the soul being indestructible (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 2). He teaches finally how the soul (*puruṣa*) leaves the weakening body like a ripe fruit leaving the tree, and turns to its origin, the *ātman*. Just as a king leaves a village, accompained by warriors, judges etc., the soul is accompained by the *prāṇas* and enters the heart together with them. When then the eye leaves for the sun, the *puruṣa* does not see any longer,—he does not smell, taste, speak, think, etc. Together with the *prāṇas* he leaves the body, guided by his knowledge and *karman* in order to be reborn or to reach *mokṣa* (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 3, 35 *seq.*).

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[15] H. V. Glasenapp *loc. cit.* 1940, 321.

[16] V. I. Lenin, *Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus*, Berlin, 1949, 88.

Uddālaka observed rationalistically how thinking (recognising) of a dying man, speaking and breathing stop one after another and how the body finally becomes cold. Yājñavalkya also taught that all the faculties of seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, thinking, touching and knowing of a dying man disappear. But while Uddālaka observed death with commonsense or even with the eyes of a physician, Yājñavalkya had no such scholarly interest but enumerated all faculties from seeing to knowing, regarding this only as a minor point, and described with much details the wandering of the eternal soul first into the heart and then out of the body, a wandering which he had never observed. He did not care for proper observation which can be controlled by everybody. His main interest was a religious one, not scientific. He was an idealist in contrast to the materialist Uddālaka.

Uddālaka next described a dying tree, which is being felled. The *rasa* leaves one bough after the other and finally the whole tree ; but, he adds, the *rasa* does not die. This life is *satya* (*Ch. Up.* vi. 11). According to Uddālaka, water (*āpaḥ*) is life or breath (*prāṇa*) (*Ch. Up.* vi. 5, 2), and a man while fasting is obliged to drink water in order to preserve his life (*Ch. Up.* vi. 7, 1). The *rasa* of the tree is some kind of water and is at the same time the life of the tree. When a bough is cut, *rasa* and life leave it ; but *rasa* or life is not destroyed but goes on existing in the *sat* into which it has gone after the death of the tree. *Sat* is living matter, it is eternal according to this hylozoism.

Yājñavalkya also described at the end of his long discussion the death of a tree, comparing the tree with the body of a man, especially the *rasa* with the blood, coming out of a wounded tree, tree and body, respectively (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 9, 28 *śloka* 2). But his interest is not focussed on the *rasa*. He cares for the fact that a tree, when felled, is growing again from its root. Only if the root is destroyed, the tree cannot grow again. He asks his adversaries in the discussion : What corresponds to this growing again of the tree out of its root as regards a man ?

He alone knows the answer : Rebirth out of *brahman.* Here again the difference between Yājñavalkya's religious intention and Uddālaka's materialism becomes clear.

Yājñavalkya in another place maintains that at death blood and semen enter water, just as the body enters earth (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 2, 13), when the soul follows the ways of *karman*, whilst Uddālaka taught that the ultimate living material into which the decaying body enters is eternal. Yājñavalkya taught that the individual body dissolves in the dead material which might be eternal, but the individual soul is what matters, being born again and again according to *karman.* Here again the religious idea of rebirth prevails in the doctrine of Yājñavalkya.

And his idealism becomes also clear in another place where he teaches that the heart is the base on which the semen is founded just as water is based on the semen and as Varuṇa, the protector of the western region, is based on water. In similar ways the other human faculties, like seeing etc., are based on the respective objects, the forms etc., which are founded in the heart, the faculties being on the other hand the base for a respective goddess in one of the different regions. Thus the heart is the ultimate base of the world,— the subjective heart being the base of the objective forms etc.,—which is an idealistic outlook.

In order to persuade his opponent Yājñavalkya adds that people, regarding a son who is similar to his father, say that he has come out of the heart of his father. This custom proves, he pretends, that the semen descends from the heart (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 9, 21). But this cannot prove the doctrine that water is based on semen, Varuṇa on water in the western region,—in short, the idealism of Yājñavalkya cannot be proved in this way.

2. *Sleep*

Uddālaka interprets sleep (*svapna*) with the help of an etymology as "*svam apītaḥ*" : a sleeping man is gone into himself. He illustrates this fanciful etymology with the example of a bird which flies all around and finaly sits down at the place of its binding. It seems that a falcon is meant which is bound to some place as long as it is not used for hunting. Thus, Uddālaka goes on, the *manas* flies all around till it sits down at its binding place, the breath (*Ch. Up.* vi. 8, 1-2). This means : The mind of a person awake wanders from object to object till the man gets tired, then *manas* comes back into the man (*svam apītaḥ*) and setttles on the breath. A sleeping man does not think indeed, but his breath goes on. Without breath there can be no thinking, as all the so-called magicians of the doctrine of breath-wind[17] had shown. Breath binds mind to body according to Uddālaka.

This doctrine reminds us of the discussion between Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka where Uddālaka asks for the string which binds this world and the world beyond and all beings together, and Yājñavalkya answers : This string is the wind (*Bṛ. Up.* iii. 7, 1-2). Uddālaka agrees to this answer. Wind and breath were regarded as the ultimate realities in macro-and-micro-cosms by the above-mentioned magicians of wind and breath, and Uddālaka was closely related to their way of thinking.[18] Yājñavalkya in this case answered the question of his opponent according to what he knew of his,—i.e. Uddālaka's,—conception of the importance of the binding wind-breath. But Yājñavalkya's own doctrine of sleep was quite different from that of Uddālaka.

Uddāklaka imagined *manas* when awake as migrating out of the body and when it falls asleep returning into it, into *svam*, that is into *ātman*, into the Self, *svam ātmānam* meaning body in this hylozoist-materialistic 'theory in concordance with the very old conception that the self is the body.[19]

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, spoke also in connection with sleep of the bird, of an eagle or falcon which, out of fatigue, sits down. Similarly, he goes on, the *puruṣa* hurries to the *antaḥ* where he sees no dream (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 3, 19). The *manas* in Uddālaka's doctrine wanders outside the body in order to come into contact with reality to get proper knowledge. But the *puruṣa* in Yājñavalkya's theory wanders to a region far away from the body in dream and sleep in order to enjoy freedom of the objective world of daily life. This difference marks again the difference between materialism and idealism.

This *antaḥ* (end) of sleep is opposed to the *antaḥ* of being awake (*ib.* 18), and the *puruṣa* wanders along both *antaḥ* just as a fish swims along both sides of a river. The *antaḥ*-s are also called *loka*-s (worlds) or *sthāna*-s (places), and there is a third *sthāna*, the region of dreams, which connects the two other *sthāna*-s. Standing in third dream-place, the *puruṣa* looks at both the worlds, the world of suffering here

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17. About these representatives of the Vāyu-prāṇa-doctrine cf. W. Ruben, *loc. cit.* 1954, 80 and 84 *seq.*
18. But he regards *prāṇa* as a product of *āpaḥ*.
19. P. Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, 1 (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1920), 285, *seq.*, 326 *seq.*

and that of bliss beyond. And when he falls asleep, he creates with the material which he takes from this world the objects in the world of dreams—chariots, lakes, rivers, rejoicings, etc. On this occasion Yājñavalkya quotes some stanzas which deal with the phenomenon of dream in somewhat other ways. They have a shamanistic outlook. According to them the soul of a sleeping man leaves the body, does not fall asleep itself, looks at the sleeping body, which is protected by breath, roams around as it wants, being eternal, the golden man, the single swan (*ib.* 11-12). So far this theory of sleep and dream is in full concordance with primitive shamanistic ideas which are well-known from Central Asia, etc.[20] According to them mind or soul leaves the body in cantrast to Uddālaka's conception that in sleep mind comes back into the body.

Then the next stanza goes on : In sleep he creates many forms, enjoying women, eating or seeing dangers (*ib.* 13). This corresponds with Yājñavalkya's idealistic conception of the *puruṣa* creating in dream rivers etc., which is also in complete contrast to Uddālaka's description of sleep which looks very realistic, in correspondence with the general contrast of his materialism with Yājñavalkya's idealism.

Uddālaka later on describes how a man, falling asleep,[21] enters *sat* and becomes unaware of his individuality, just as the *rasa*-s of different flowers lose their identity and the knowledge of it when they become one and the same mass of honey. But when the man awakes he gets back his individuality and its consciousness. Just as rivers become united in the ocean and (by evaporation and rainfall) come out of the ocean[22] again without being conscious of having been united and having forgotten their individuality during their stay in the ocean, thus men also, when awakened, do not remember that they have been in sleep united in *sat*, losing their individuality and its consciousness (*Ch. Up.* vi, 9-10).

Correspondingly, Yājñavalkya taught that in sleep a father becomes a non-father, a mother a non-mother, worlds become non-worlds, gods non-gods, Vedas non-Vedas, the thief a non-thief and in the same way a murderer of an embryo, a Cāṇḍāla, a Paulkasa, a *śramaṇa* and a *tāpasa* lose their identity (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 3, 22), because in sleep there is neither good nor evil. This stressing of the moral aspect is missing in Uddālaka's teaching of sleep whilst Yājñavalkya is interested in describing sleep as something happy, free from the sufferings of this world. He goes on : Sleeping, one does not see anything, but seeing itself (or rather the faculty of seeing) goes on being a faculty of the eternal subject which in sleep does not practically see, because there is no object to be seen. The same holds true for all the other faculties—of smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, thinking, touching and recognising. When the subject in this way stands alone without an object, it is in the stage of the *brahman*-world, the highest bliss (*ib.* 23-33). Here again the idealism of Yājñavalkya is obvious : In sleep not only the subjective activities and characters of men disappear but also the objective world and the Vedas ; of course they are extinct for the sleeping man only, but Yājñavalkya omits to make this restriction clear. Idealism is quite overt in Yājñavalkya's view of the eternal soul as eternally seeing etc. Here again one observes the idealistic escapism of Yājñavalkya, for whom the highest bliss is to be free from this world, a point totally absent in Uddālaka's materialism.

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[20] Cf. Ruben in *Acta Orientalia* xviii, 191 *seq.*

[21] I follow Deussen in contrast to Jacobi (*loc. cit.* 1923, 10 : death).

[22] Yājñavalkya uses the term *ekāyana* in *Bṛ. Up.* iv. 5. 12 for the organ of sense.

3. *Mind*

This materialism is further expressed in Uddālaka's doctrine that mind is becoming out of food just as breath (life) out of water and speech out of fire (*Ch. Up.* vi. 5). It was common among the old thinkers to identify speech with fire and breath (life) with water. But to pretend that mind is food was something stupendous. It was the climax of this text of Uddālaka teaching his son Śvetaketu (*Ch. Up.* vi. 1-7) and he felt the necessity to prove this thesis. Therefore, he used the churning of milk as analogy to human digestion : just as milk is separated in three parts, food becomes threefold—its finest parts become mind, the middle ones flesh, the coarsest ones excrements. And finally he made his son undergo the experiment of fasting in order to show that drinking water keeps him alive but avoiding food makes him lose his thinking (rather memory). When he eats again, his knowledge, his mind, comes back, as we would say, or his mind is recreated by food, as Uddālaka taught. This conception reminds us of the later Sāṃkhya ideas according to which *buddhi* is the first product of *prakṛti*. But in Sāṃkhya *buddhi* works only in connection with soul (*puruṣa*), while in Uddālaka's materialism there is no *puruṣa*, no eternal soul as the ultimate and only subject.

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, identified *ātman* with *brahman* and mind, breath, seeing, hearing, earth, water, wind, etc. (*Bṛ. Up.* iv. 4, 5) in concordance with his radical idealism, according to which the spiritual soul is the ultimate reality. He agreed in this respect with Śāṇḍilya who declared *brahman* to consist of mind

(*Ch. Up*. iii. 14, 2), with Satyakāma who identified one sixteenth of *brahman* with mind (*Ch. Up*. iv. 8, 3) or mind with *brahman*, as Yājñavalkya quoted him (*Bṛ. Up*. iv. 1, 6) and with the anonymous idealist of *Ch. Up*. iii. 18, 1. On another occasion Yājñavalkya taught that the mind of a dying man went to the moon (*Bṛ. Up*. iii. 2, 13) in agreement with the teaching of one of the breath-wind magician in *Bṛ. Up*. i. 3, 16. Perhaps Yājñavalkya in this context understood mind as the material base of thinking in the body. At all events he once stressed the point that there is inside mind the real subject, the *antaryāmin*, who is governing not only mind but also breath, speech, seeing, hearing, knowing, semen, earth, water, fire, air, wind, heaven, sun, moon, stars, all beings, in short, the whole world (*Bṛ. Up*. iii. 7, 3 *seq.*) This subject is the unseen seer, the unthought thinker, i. e. the absolute subject, the only thinker besides whom there is no other thinker. Yājñavalkya confessed that this ultimate subject cannot be recognised. Quite in contrast to Uddālaka he did not strive to prove the existence and power of this spiritual subject. And, it is remarkable that he described this subject just in his discussion with Uddālaka who had heard of such a 'governor of the whole world from inside' from a demon who had taken possession of a woman. Uddālaka listened to the unproved description of this *antaryāmin* which was in sharp contrast to his own hylozoistic conception of mind being created out of matter in the form of food, and he kept silent at the end. The author, an idealist of this discussion, did not dare to make Uddālaka accept this idealistic religious doctrine of Yājñavalkya, but he avoided also to maintain Uddālaka's repudiation of it.

In his discussion with Uṣasta, one of the breath-wind magicians, Yājñavalkya also referred to this unknowable subject : You cannot think the thinker of the thinking (*Bṛ. Up*. iii. 4, 2.) and he called this unknowable subject the *akṣaram* (*ib*. 8, 11) which is *ātman-brahman*. Knowing (of the supreme existence of) this innermost *ātman*, real Brahmins give up all desire for practical success, reach childhood beyond all learning and become silent (*Bṛ, Up*. iii. 5). In this way Yājñavalkya connects his agnostic doctrine of the Ultimate reality of this only and unthinkable subject with his highest goal of world-detesting pessimism which stands in contrast to Uddālaka's materialism.

4. *Monism.*

Uddālaka wants to teach his pupil the one real which, being known, makes everything known, and this reality is the *sat*. He illustrates this monism with the examples of clay which being known make all pots known, of copper and iron which being known make all products of these metals known. Knowledge of matter, of *sat*, is the goal of this materialistic monism. As proof he gives illustrations from well-known handicrafts in Indian villages (*Ch. Up*. vi. 1).

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, when he taught his beloved Maitreyī, declared that the main object of his philosophy was *ātman*. By seeing, hearing, thinking and understanding *ātman* all is known (*Bṛ. Up*. iv. 5, 6). Everything, the Brahmin-caste, the Kshatriya-caste, the worlds, the gods, the Vedas, all beings are in *ātman*. Just as when a drum is beaten, the drum might be grasped but not the sounds outside the drum, in the same way the *ātman* should be grasped and then all the worlds, gods, Vedas, beings, etc. are grasped. The conch-shell and the sounds resulting from its blowing, and the *vīṇā* and her sounds are other examples given by Yājñavalkya in this connection, being three altogether, just as Uddālaka had given three illustrations for his monism (*Bṛ. Up*. iv 5, 8-10).

Here again the idealism of Yājñavalkya stands in contrast to the materialism of Uddālaka. The illustration of clay, copper and iron is easily understood ; but that of the sounds is strange. What the average man sees, observes and knows is the objective world (which corresponds to the sounds), and Yājñavalkya has himself on several occasions pointed out that it is impossible to know, see, hear etc. the ultimate subject, the *ātman-brahman* (which corresponds to the drum etc.). But here he pretends that knowledge of the *ātman* makes all the world known.

Uddālaka so understood his materialistic monism that he was not satisfied in maintaining only that it is sufficient to know *sat* the ultimate material ; he moreover worked hard to teach his pupil how primary matter became the objective world of sun, moon, lightning and fire, of all the different things with their names and forms, of the human body, breath, mind etc. ; how sleep, hunger, thirst and even an ordeal and teaching worked. In short he taught an encyclopaedic materialistic monism.

Yājñavalkya, on the other hand, turned again and again to *ātman-brahman* although he knew that it was impossibe to know it. When asked, he could answer to a lot of questions as regards the phenomena of the world, but his main interest was, in contrast to Uddālaka, not to explain the becoming of the world but to become free from the world.

Correspondingly Uddālaka maintained that the world, being nothing else than a transformation of *sat*, was eternal and the *sat* could not develop out of an *asat*, because this was unthinkable (*Ch. Up*. vi. 2, 2). Today we would formulate : *sat* is according to definition being, not becoming out of something else, out of *asat*.

Yājñavalkya maintained quite the same as regards *ātman.* He is eternal, he is born without a birth in a *saṃsāra*, without any beginning and even in socalled rebirth he cannot be born again (*Bṛ. Up.* iii, 9, 28, 7). Reborn is *ātman* only insofar as he receives a new body. The progressive modern scientist agrees with Uddālaka that matter is eternal, without beginning and always changing its form. But he cannot understand Yājñavalkya who teaches religion rather than scientific philosophy.

Uddālaka in his philosophy does not deal with problems of rebirth, of an eternal soul, *karman* or *mokṣa.* With scholarly observation and understandable examples, he tries to convince his pupil to accept his materialistic hylozoist monism, quite in contrast to Yājñavalkya's idealism which is founded on introspection and the tradition of shamanism which was certainly living in prehistoric India and developed into *yoga*. Thus, it is possible to show the fundamental difference between the materialism of Uddālaka and the idealism of Yājñavalkya, but insofar as hylozoism to a great extent looks similar to pantheism, the redactors of the *Chāndogyopaniṣat* accepted this materialistic philosophy into their idealistic-religious textbook and preserved this highly valuable document of old thinking.

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